



# AtTAHALOF

IMCTC Quarterly Magazine

Issue 1, November 2019



**His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman  
THE WILLPOWER OF 41 COUNTRIES HAS  
COME TOGETHER TO COUNTER TERRORISM**



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
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إِسْلَامِيكَوَالْمِلِّيَّاتِي  
ISLAMIC MILITARY COUNTER TERRORISM

# At TAHALOF

Issue1, November 2019

## IMCTC Quarterly Magazine



General Directorate of Planning and Coordination

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**At-TAHALOF  
Inauguration  
Statement by  
His Royal Highness  
Prince Mohammed bin  
Salman bin Abdul Aziz**

Crown Prince, Deputy Prime  
Minister and Minister of Defense  
Chairman of the IMCTC Ministers  
of Defense Council

**THE WILLPOWER OF  
41 COUNTRIES HAS  
CONVERGED TO COUN-  
TER TERRORISM**



**4**

**EXTREMIST  
REHABILITATION  
PROGRAMS  
IN SOMALIA**

BETWEEN DISENGAGEMENT  
AND DERADICALIZATION



**12**

**AtTAHALOF**

IMCTC Quarterly Magazine



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6

## THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY



18

### CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM IN G5 SAHEL POTENTIAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES




24

### Boko Haram AND TAKING A BET ON CONFRONTATION



28

### SPOTLIGHTS ON THE 2019 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX



### The Black Legacy of Terrorism Are Daesh Families Victims or Criminals?

30



### JORDAN STANDS OUT TO TERRORISM MILITARY AND SOFT APPROACHES

36



### Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing

40

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## Inauguration Statement by His Royal Highness

**Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz**

Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense

Chairman of the IMCTC Ministers of Defense Council

# THE WILLPOWER OF 41 COUNTRIES HAS CONVERGED TO COUNTER TERRORISM

 Terrorist crimes the world is encountering today portend grave dangers, and the confrontations thereof have become an irrevocable and irreversible choice. It is such a notoriously long-term, full-scale and wide-spread war. Terrorism is no longer confined to and locked in a particular geographical area, or a specific national group; terrorism is immune to borders, and there is no region in the world that is impregnable against its evils. Terrorism is a horrific and appalling crime against humanity, no matter what ideological, religious or ethnic slogans it uses to lurk behind as a camouflage or a decoy. It stands to reason that no one single compelling justification is seen plausible for killing innocent people, wreaking terror, vandalizing property and sowing chaos.

Public awareness of the existing and imminent dangers of terrorism and unanimity in its outright rejection do not suffice to eliminate it. Rather, alliances must be sought and built up among the world countries to achieve this goal. This is what we have realized in the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), where the collective will of 41 countries stands allied to defeat terrorism, to protect their peoples, to safeguard their security and to fulfill their responsibilities towards the international community.

There is no doubt that the emergence, ubiquity, survival and continuation of terrorist groups shall always require substantial and all-out support of funds, weapons, shelter, sanctuary, facilities and logistical services. It has been used as a means by some extremists coming from groups and regimes to implement their plots and achieve their goals, considering it a low-cost war in which they move their arms and agents to spread chaos and undermine countries and societies.

Our civilized world shall not accept such behavior, and it shall eradicate and eliminate it through international cooperation and bilateral and collective agreements in which the world countries shall commit themselves to renouncing and criminalizing terrorism, drying up its sources of financing and not granting terrorists any form of protection or asylum in their countries.







# THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY



**T**errorism is a global phenomenon that knows no limits, with its rampant impact snowballing ubiquitously into the world six continents, claiming the lives of 18,814 people in 2017, and causing direct economic losses of \$52 billion in the same year, as reported by the 2018 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), let alone other indirect losses. For instance, the costs of fighting terrorism in the United States alone amounted to \$5.9 trillion from 2001 to 2018, according to the COSTS OF WAR PROJECT, not to mention the damage incurred to activities of economy, investment, tourism and security operations.

Both in principle and in practice, a holistic international approach, concerted efforts and supporting capabilities are urgently required to confront such formidable challenge of sheer magnitude, which the United Nations has always sought to achieve through a comprehensive strategy to combat and counter terrorism. In this context, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in its resolution 60/288, 8 September, 2006. The foregoing strategy came in the form of a resolution along with an action plan, which was a unique global instrument to improve national, regional and international efforts to combat and counter terrorism. It was the first time that all member states had agreed on a unified strategic approach to combating and countering terrorism. The strategy was officially acclaimed and launched at a high-level meeting of the General Assembly, 19 September 2006. The strategy adopts a holistic approach and principally includes four main pillars:

1. Measures to address conditions favorable and conducive to the spread of terrorism.
2. Measures to prevent, combat and counter terrorism.
3. Measures to build the capacities of the world countries to prevent, combat and counter terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations thereof.
4. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental pillar in the fight against terrorism.

The strategy was issued following the recommendations of the report of the secretary-general of the United Nations submitted to the General Assembly on 27 April 2006 titled "United in

the Face of Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Strategy to Combat Terrorism". The decision to issue the strategy states that the General Assembly shall assess every two years, "the progress made in implementing the strategy, and consider updating it so as to respond to changes".

The action plan annexed to the strategy includes the commitment of United Nations member states to counter-terrorism measures, as follows:


1. To condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations consistently, unequivocally and vigorously, whosoever the perpetrators and accomplices are, wheresoever it is committed, and whatsoever its purposes are, on the grounds that it is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.
2. To take urgent measures to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in particular:
  - a. To consider acceding to, without delay, the existing international conventions and protocols on counter-terror-

b. To implement all General Assembly resolutions on efforts to eliminate, combat and counter international terrorism and relevant General Assembly resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

c. To implement all Security Council resolutions on international terrorism and to entirely cooperate with the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council on counter-terrorism in carrying out their mandates.

3. To recognize that international cooperation and any measures undertaken by the member states to prevent and combat terrorism shall be consistent with their continued commitments and obligations under international law, including the charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

The strategy was followed up by several UN bodies, including the Coun-



ter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which was established a year before the strategy was issued, under which 38 entities are subsumed, each

ism and the implementation thereof, and to make every possible effort to reach and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

of which makes contributions consistent with its own mandate. In June 2014, the activities of the Task Force entities were compiled based on the report of the Secretary-General on "Activities of the United Nations in the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy",

and plays a key role in assisting countries to implement measures aimed at strengthening their legal and institutional capacities to combat terrorist activities (Pillar III of the Strategy).

While the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Glob-

The Security Council, Resolution 2129 (2013), approved the work tasked with the center and its vital role in building the capacities of the member states. On June 15, 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 291/71 to establish the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office



submitted to the General Assembly on 11 April 2014.

Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council (CTC) was established in 2001 as one of the United Nations counter-terrorism bodies. Following the issuance of the strategy, it has become within its competence to follow up thoroughly its progress. The CTC in tandem with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), established in 2017, is an arm of the United Nations in addressing counter-terrorism issues stated in the strategy.

The committee is composed of all the 15 members of the UN Security Coun-

cil and plays a key role in assisting countries to implement measures aimed at strengthening their legal and institutional capacities to combat terrorist activities (Pillar III of the Strategy).

While the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Global Strategy rests with the member states, the United Nations counter-terrorism bodies work to meet the needs of the member states, provide them with policy support, disseminate in-depth knowledge of the strategy and further expedite the delivery of technical assistance where necessary. The Counter-Terrorism Center was established in 2011 pursuant to the recommendation stated in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Pillar II), to provide capacity-building assistance to the member states in implementing counter-terrorism projects worldwide in accordance with the Global Strategy.

(UNOCT) to replace the Task Force. Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov was appointed Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office on June 21, 2017 to oversee the Task Force and the CTC. The CTC has the following main mandates:

- To lead counter-terrorism efforts through the mandate entrusted by the UN General Assembly.
- To strengthen coordination and coherence among the 38 entities of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (formerly the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force) to ensure balanced implementation of the four pillars of the United



Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

- To strengthen the United Nations assistance rendered to the member states in capacity-building in countering terrorism.
- To improve visibility, advocacy and resource mobilization for United Nations counter-terrorism efforts.
- To ensure that countering terrorism is number-one priority across the United Nations, and that important work in preventing violent extremism is firmly and deeply rooted in the Strategy.
- To establish close relationships with the Security Council bodies and the member states, and to strengthen existing and developing new partnerships through itinerant missions and attendance at counter-terrorism-re-

lated meetings.

The United Nations Office on Counter-Terrorism issues a monthly bulletin UNOCT In Review that monitors its work in implementing the strategy. The August 2019 issue of the bulletin revealed the training of 1010 people in 45 counter-terrorism workshops from January to August 2019, as well as 13 expert meetings and 10 technical missions in August, within the fourth pillar of the strategy. In harmony with the implementation of the resolution to establish the strategy, the United Nations General Assembly meets every two years to review the strategy and assess progress made in its implementation. The General Assembly conducted its first review of the strategy at a meet-

ing on 4 and 5 September 2008. The meeting concluded with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 62/272, with 14 items, including the emphasis that the responsibility for implementing the strategy rests primarily with the member states, with emphasis on the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations, to call on the member states to do their utmost to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, and to emphasize the importance of strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

In its second review of the strategy in September 2010, the General Assembly, Resolution 279/62, called on the member states, the United Nations and relevant international, regional



and sub-regional organizations to intensify their efforts to implement the Strategy in an integrated manner and in all its aspects. The United Nations entities involved in supporting counter-terrorism efforts called for the promotion and protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms, due legal procedures and the rule of law in the context of counter-terrorism.

On 1 July 2016, the United Nations General Assembly conducted the fifth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and adopted Resolution 291/70 that stated 72 recommendations relating to the four pillars of the Strategy. This included the emphasis of the importance of maintaining the continued relevance of the Strategy in the light

of emerging threats and trends of global ever-changing terrorism and mandating the Secretary-General to review, in consultation with the General Assembly, the capacity of the United Nations to assist the member states in implementing the Strategy in a balanced manner.

During the sixth review of the Strategy conducted in June 2018, the most updated review, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 284/72, with 85 recommendations relating to the four pillars of the Strategy. It includes the emphasis of the importance of implementing all pillars of the Strategy in an integrated and balanced manner and intensify efforts to call on the states that have not become parties and signatories

to the existing conventions and protocols to combat terrorism. It also calls on the member states to make stronger efforts to address the conditions conducive and favorable to the spread of terrorism, and to take into account that terrorism shall not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone, and to encourage the member states to engage local communities and non-state actors in the development of strategies to address the speech of violent extremism, and the establishment of mechanisms to attract the youth in the promotion of a culture of peace, tolerance, egalitarian society and interfaith, intercultural and interreligious dialogue.



# EXTREMIST REHABILITATION PROGRAMS IN SOMALIA: BETWEEN DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALIZATION

■ Editorial Team

Radicalization has become an unending source of anxiety, panic and instability rampant in countries, societies and in every corner of the globe. Nowadays, the worried voices are increasingly calling out for the need to contain extremists and terrorists through special rehabilitation programs and integrate them into their societies. Strategically, this should be first initiated by disengaging them from their affiliated groups, as a step towards deradicalization, while establishing security and peace instead of violence and terrorism.

This report, published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in 2019, presents detailed information about the Serendi programme, as well as wider empirical evidence drawn from interviews with 129 current and former residents on issues such as how and why they have enlisted in Al-Shabaab in the first place, how and why they have disengaged, and their experiences of reintegration. While closely related prison-based initiatives have become increasingly common over recent years in countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Yemen, Serendi-style semi-open residential rehabilitation centers for 'low-risk' former violent

extremists remain comparatively rare. The authors of this report advocate for cautiously upscaling such efforts in Somalia, as well as exploring the possibilities to replicate this form of programming in other comparable environments. The authors of this report advocate for cautiously upscaling such efforts in Somalia, as well as exploring the possibilities to replicate this form of programming in other comparable environments. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world's oldest and the UK's leading defense and security think tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. RUSI is a research-led institute, producing



independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today's complex challenges. Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities.

The key findings revealed in the report by James Khalil, Rory Brown, Chris Chant, Peter Oloow and Nick Wood explored the possibility of replicating this type of center in other similar settings, as well as the Somali rehabilitation experience and the lessons learned.

This report focuses on the Serendi rehabilitation center in Mogadishu, which was originally established in 2012, and since 2015 has been co-managed by the Ministry of Internal Security and Adam Smith International's Rehabilitation Support Team (RST). The latter provides considerable direction through technical support, guidance and capacity building. On a day-to-day basis, the center is run by a team of 57 national staff, which includes managers and administrators, social workers, teachers, vocational instructors, medical professionals, imams, and sports coaches.

#### **Deradicalization National Program**

Since 1991, after the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship, Somalia has been caught up in undulating phases of a civil war played out among various clans, larger entities aspiring to statehood, warlords, and Islamist groups amidst a profound meltdown of state institutions, including the national military and police forces. Despite extensive and repeated international efforts over three decades to stabilize the country and rebuild national state institutions capable of delivering order and public services, oftentimes the most effective stabilizing actors have been Islamist groups. Mogadishu-based national governments sponsored by various and often competing actors of the international community have for the most part proved unstable, prone to incessant political and clan squabbles, and un-

able to deliver even a modicum of acceptable governance while facing potent military opponents.

One of the leading and impressively active rehabilitation and stability centers is Serendi Rehabilitation Center. The Serendi option is available only to those deemed to be 'low risk' – that is, individuals who voluntarily disengaged from the organization, who have denounced Al-Shabaab's ideology, and who are not seen to pose a future risk to public safety. The Serendi Rehabilitation Center in Mogadishu offers support to 'low-risk' former members of Al-Shabaab to prepare them for reintegration into the community, as part of the wider strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its international partners to counter the Organization. While certain challenges remain, between 2015 and 2018, Serendi was gradually converted into a functional center in terms of its conditions and services offered. More broadly, the National Programme consists of the following five 'pillars':

1. **Outreach:** A variety of national and international agencies are involved in both online and offline communications campaigns that aim to entice disengagement from groups such as Al-Shabaab, by targeting group members either directly or via their families and community leaders. These encompass radio-based amnesty proclamations by high-profile political figures, internet campaigns, and leaflet drops, among other methods.

2. **Reception:** It specifies how Al-Shabaab members should be received and treated in a way that is consistent with their safety, security and fundamental rights. They should also be transferred as soon as practicable into the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) custody.

3. **Screening:** The National Programme outlines the screening methodology NISA personnel should employ to cat-

egorize individuals by their levels of 'risk'. This process determines whether individuals are channeled through military courts or are given the rehabilitation center option.

4. **Rehabilitation:** It attempts to set common standards for services provided at rehabilitation centers in Somalia, including in relation to education, vocational training, psychosocial support, facilitating access to families, and so on. There is a total of four official centers, in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and Beledweyne.

5. **Reintegration:** It is concerned with supporting individuals who have been through rehabilitation programmes to successfully reintegrate into communities. It involves a variety of measures, including facilitating access to livelihood opportunities, job placements and financial services, and relocation support in relevant cases.

The services provided at the center are tailored to individual needs and circumstances, and residency is ideally intended to last around six or seven months, up to a maximum of roughly one year. The facility is residential and semi-open, and thus beneficiaries are entitled to (and strongly encouraged to take) weekend leave. They may also elect to opt out of the programme, at which point they are transferred back to NISA. Of great note, a total of 241 beneficiaries had completed their rehabilitation and departed the center through the formal exit process established in 2015, with a further 62 currently in residence.

The Program faces a spate of challenges that be tactfully addressed. This helps to maintain the momentum of its outcomes in the face of terrorist movements in Somalia. While there is no simple formula to determine which environments may be suitable, at the very least the following should be considered by donors:

- **State Support:** Donors should consider the extent to which government



stakeholders are willing to support disengagement programmes. As the authors point out in the case of Somalia, certain representatives from key agencies initially struggled to fully commit to the idea of rehabilitating violent extremists, either because they opposed 'rewarding' the perpetrators of violence, or they believed that many would in any case later return to Al-Shabaab. More broadly, certain governments simply may not be able to support such efforts, for instance, due to the need to satisfy public opposition to rehabilitation and reintegration policies, to maintain fragile political coalitions, or to retain the loyalty of armed forces. Of course, even where the necessary domestic political support does exist, limited local capacity may constrain the ability of state actors to deliver such programmes, and in such cases donors must rely on greater levels of international expertise. Donors should also ensure that different funding streams are aligned to maintain a common international strategy in support of such rehabilitation efforts.

- **Security Considerations:** Rehabilitation centers and their residents and staff are vulnerable to attacks by violent extremist groups – indeed, the more successful the programme, the more likely it is that such groups will be incentivized to target what could amount to an existential threat. Attacks may take various forms, including direct strikes on the centers, targeting of family members and staff, and assaults on beneficiaries on weekend leave. With this in mind, national and international policymakers must consider whether it is possible to identify locations that are sufficiently secure for rehabilitation centers. Donors must also ensure that adequate finance is provided within the programme budget to cover security considerations.

- **Community Acceptance:** It is prudent to accept that a lack of community



'buy-in' may undermine the reintegration process in other parts of Somalia, as also occurs in other conflict environments. Of course, many such communities are the immediate victims of violence, and thus it should come as no surprise that some members outright reject the idea of living alongside those who have previously committed atrocities. There is also the possibility that certain community members resent the fact that violent extremists are provided with basic education, vocational training, and so on, which may give them a competitive advantage over those who remained uninvolved

in such violence. While policymakers have some influence over the level of support for the rehabilitation and reintegration process – for instance through community consultations, reconciliation mechanisms, messaging campaigns about the benefits of this programming, and so on – donors should consider that public opposition may be sufficiently strong to make such initiatives unfeasible at least in certain locations.

- **Disengagement or Deradicalization?** Disengagement means the extent to which members of violent extremist organizations are likely to disengage



and is dependent on a broad range of factors. For instance, these may include esprit de corps, treatment by commanders, community support for the group in question, living conditions, the prevalence of non-ideological motives, and so on. Disengagement is widely interpreted behaviorally. Disengagement occurs when an individual renounces membership of a terrorist organization and refuses to submit to the regime imposed on its militants. However, this understanding is fairly problematic in certain contexts. The concept of belonging to a particular organization can be ambiguous, particularly in cases where the group concerned does not adopt any formal recruitment procedures.

In contrast to disengagement, deradicalization can be seen as a social and psychological process that results in attitudinal change, effectively reducing an individual's commitment to the belief that personal involvement in violence is necessary and justified. Whereas disengagement is primarily a process of behavioral change, deradicalization seeks cognitive adaptations. In most of the deradicalization programs focused on militant jihadists, a key role is assigned to conversations, dialogue and interaction with moderate Muslims. Which course of action is better? Disengagement or deradicalization? Perhaps most important is defin-

ing from the outset whether the goal of the intervention is to change the views, values and attitudes or the behaviour of the violent extremist prisoner. In Serendi, they do not attempt to change a prisoner's radical or extremist beliefs and views but instead seek to get a prisoner renounce the use of violence to achieve their objectives. The broader point is that changes in attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for changes in behaviours. On this basis, various prominent commentators suggest that programming should prioritise disengagement over deradicalization, with the former considered to be the ultimate objective.

Remarkably enough, most Serendi residents have not become involved in violent extremism on ideological grounds. A substantial number of respondents also highlighted a desire for improved living conditions. Several others asserted that they joined because Al-Shabaab helped to arrange marriages for them. In contrast, many respondents reported being substantially motivated by a variety of individual incentives and drivers, such as economic, security-related and psychosocial enticements that are contingent on personal contributions to the production of violence. Others also conceded that they were driven to join Al-Shabaab in part by the promise of

a salary and livelihood prospects in mind. Other respondents claimed that adventure-seeking also substantially influenced their decision to enlist, for instance, with a former Al-Shabaab foot soldier elaborating that a key motive was the chance to visit new places.

By contrast, they tended to disengage from the organization because their salaries were often found to be inadequate, due to familial obligations, because the living conditions were poor, and because they no longer wanted to risk their own lives. The responses also revealed that disengagements were often motivated in part by the repulsion felt towards abuses perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, particularly attacks against civilians. Also, under the category of individual incentives, most respondents asserted that a sense of guilt was a key driver of their disengagement. For instance, a former member of the police unit highlighted his remorse over a case in which Al-Shabaab severed the hand of a child who stole bread from a baker's. Evidence of positive changes at the state level contributed in part to some disengagement from violent groups according to some research studies conducted in 2017. Despite economic, security, psychosocial incentives and inducements, a sense of family commitment is perhaps the most impor-

tant motivation for disengaging from Al-Shabaab.

Current efforts to rehabilitate voluntarily disengaged members of Al-Shabaab within the National Programme framework rest upon the amnesty proclaimed by then newly sworn-in President Mohamed in April 2017. Yet, such declarations are unclear in terms of scope, and have only been verbally communicated by the Office of the President, rather than precisely defined within Somali policy and legal frameworks.

The informal nature of these amnesty proclamations is problematic, at the very least as a lack of precise details creates difficulties in communicating both the eligibility criteria and the entitlements associated with this process to potential defectors, security-force actors, and other relevant stakeholders. Advisors are supporting the FGS in advocating for and drafting a clear amnesty policy and legal framework.

#### **Activities of Rehabilitation Programs**

The Serendi team delivers disengagement programming through basic education, vocational training, psychosocial support, family reconnection activities, and so on, and focuses on deradicalization through civic, political and religious education and 'orientation sessions' provided by the center imams. Beneficiaries receive focused, non-specialized psychosocial and mental health support as required, and receive tailored and responsive case management support spanning the rehabilitation process.

The leisure facilities now available at the center include a new artificial grass football pitch, a basketball court and a library with Somali- and English-language books and all facilities are in regular use. A professional coach comes regularly to the center and oversees the games, which bring together the defectors, the center staff and sometimes the guards. All of this contributes to the visibly improved

mental and physical well-being of the defectors. Beneficiaries attend and participate in classes in education and vocational training and participate in life-skills initiatives, appropriate to existing livelihood opportunities and tailored to individual needs and ambitions.

Unpacking the elements within these statements in turn, the education classes cover standard school subjects such as math, Somali, Arabic, English, science, history and social studies. These classes are aligned with the national curriculum. The vocational training currently includes courses in welding, auto-mechanics and tailoring. The RST is exploring possibilities to expand these provisions to also include electrical installation driving, carpentry, agriculture and information communications technology (ICT).

The 'life-skills initiatives' refer to civic, political and religious education, personal development courses such as entrepreneurship skills, human rights training, and personal hygiene, as well as structured recreational activities. To date, the core 'reconnection activity' has been the facilitation of access to families and clans, including assistance with locating estranged members. The 'non-specialized psychosocial support' includes solution-focused counselling and group work provided by trained social workers and general healthcare providers. Psychiatric illnesses are diagnosed and treated, with cases that require institutional care being referred to external mental-health service providers for further management.

Due to the high rate of financial motivation for recruitment into the Mujahideen Youth Movement, the program team makes economic reintegration a key objective, taking into account the reality of chronic unemployment in Somalia. Economic reintegration was thus undertaken by diversifying formal and informal livelihoods. These

include making charcoal by burning trees, transporting the product to the market, construction, teaching the Holy Quran, driving vehicles to transport people or goods and major commodities such as food and beverages, as well as encouraging business. Family and social networks have played a decisive impact, contributing to the inmates' finding appropriate opportunities for acceptable income.

These efforts are collectively intended to achieve both disengagement and deradicalization objectives. The former concept is applicable in the sense that many of these provisions are designed to influence future behaviours of residents directly, thus aiming to reduce the likelihood of a return to violence. The CPR and orientation sessions aim to drive positive attitudinal change regarding the FGS, the Somali National Army (SNA), the international community, democratic principles, the illegitimacy of violence, and other such topics.

The authors of this report advocate for cautiously upscaling such efforts in Somalia, as well as exploring the possibilities to replicate this form of programming in other comparable environments. While closely related prison-based initiatives have become increasingly common over recent years in countries, Serendi-style semi-open residential rehabilitation centers for 'low-risk' former violent extremists remain comparatively rare. While there is no simple formula to determine which environments may be suitable, at the very least the factors conducive to engagement with violent movements should be considered. Such factors can be physical, economic, social and psychological, and the search for meaning in life. Being aware of these factors accurately helps to formulate customized and case-tailored programs that can disengage individuals from extremist and violent movements in different regions of the world.

# CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM IN G5 SAHEL

## POTENTIAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

■ Dr. Ghalib Abdul Aziz Al-Zamil<sup>(\*)</sup>

The reality grounded in disintegrating and dismantling Daesh solid organization structure, while increasingly becoming dwarfed into few yet scattered groups catapulted by fragmentation impact into close confinement sent a powerfully compelling message of the ability to roundly defeat terrorism and eliminate affiliated groups that hold onto vast territory. With such positive messages resonating all over the globe, however, certain areas have expressed higher levels of fears and anxieties about the fragmentation and disintegration of such organizations in that they have snowballed into a terrible threat to their national and regional security. The G5 Sahel has experienced the same line of concern; as the consequential events have led up to the infiltration of elements of such organizations into this vulnerable territory, especially due to the problematic border control and associated surveillance operations. In addition to the risk factor of infiltrating, slipping and sneaking into areas in the immediate vicinity, the greatest threat to the countries of the region is triggered by the existence of multiple and overlapping organizations, which increased the risk of reintegration. While some terrorist organizations have made successful attempts in infiltrating countries and societies, and have been able to recruit and under-

mine their security and stability, the bitter reality is that new approaches must be sought to confront and eradicate such boomerang organizations.

This report reveals the underlying reality of terrorism in the G5 Sahel. It also narrates the experience of the G5 Sahel in countering terrorism through common policies and tangible efforts aimed at reducing its existing and potential risks while mitigating its devastating effects at all levels.

#### **Terrorist Organizations in the G5 Sahel**

The G5 Sahel is one of the most important regions experiencing the increasingly growing threat of terrorism and organized crime

in Africa. Strikingly enough, such organizations are glaringly mushrooming, while holding fast to retain their identity, steering clear of being stuck into a vortex of major transnational organizations, such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda. Here is a brief profile of each of the selected key terrorist organizations across the region.

#### **1. Africa Daesh**

The state of West Africa was born following the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made by Abi Bakr Shikaw, leader of Boko Haram, in March 2015. It lasted no more than one year; in August 2016, Daesh dismissed Abu Bakr Shikaw and appointed instead

parts: one headed by Barnawi with about 3,500 fighters, and one led by Shikaw with about 1,000 fighters.

The disintegration or fragmentation grew further worse over the last three years. Shikaw has been relocated in central and southern Borno State (eastern Nigeria), including the Sambisa Forest, which is the historical stronghold of the Movement. Barnawi's supporters extended their activity north of Borno State in the Lake Chad Basin. In March 2019, disputes further deepened following the ouster of Abu Musab al-Barnawi two years after he took over the leadership. He was succeeded by Abu Abdullah Omar al-Barnawi.




Daesh fighters surrendered following the fall of their last stronghold in Syria (Baghouz)

over the first decade of the current century. The peacefulness in the G5 Sahel has undergone a spate of more conflicts triggered by a plague of multiple extremist groups. Increasingly, the number jumped beyond 64 active terrorist organiza-

Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who was the Official Spokesman and son of the founder of the Movement Muhammad Yusuf. As a result of Shikaw's rejection of such a decision and his adherence to Boko Haram, the branch then bifurcated into two

Observers attributed such a measure to accusing him of being too moderate, especially as he focused his attacks on military sites; unlike Boko Haram that draws no line between civilian or military targets while carrying out attacks



and does cut areas any slack whatsoever. The Sahara branch (the Islamic State in the Sahara) emerged following the pledge of allegiance to Daesh Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made by Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, the official spokesperson of the Tawhid and Jihad Movement in West Africa, and Member of the Al-Murabiten Affiliate of Al-Qaeda. The foregoing allegiance per se brought about the dismissal of Sahrawi and his supporters from the Organization (Al-Murabiten). This branch is limited and confined to the border triangle between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, most of its activities focus on targeting border police stations. The most notorious attempt that bungled miserably was the helpless

efforts to storm a prison in Niamey, capital of Nigeria, in mid-October 2016.

**2. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries**

The branch of the organization is associated with the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which in 2006 officially declared its affiliation with Al-Qaeda. It then was renamed (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries) and is led by Abdelmalek Droukhal, also known as Abu Musab Abdel-Wadoud. Leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar took over the supervisory responsibilities for the Group in the Sahara, bordering Mali and Niger, before defecting. The Branch is the primary source of logistical support for terrorist groups operating in

West Africa.

**3. Support for Islam and Muslims Group**

In March 2017, four extremist groups operating in the G5 Sahel announced they merged into one organizational entity, nicknamed Nusrat Al-Islam and Muslimeen, led by Iyad Ghali. The Group seeks to establish itself as a dominant actor in the face of the growing influence of the Islamic State (Daesh) and strengthen its capacity to counter government efforts in the G5 Sahel.

Nusrat Al-Islam and Muslims announced the pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab Al-Wadud, Emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries, and Hibatullah Akhundzadeh, prince of Taliban.

**G5 Sahel**

Given the fact of the increase in terrorist activity and the critically enormous threat that has become a bitter reality today, the will of five countries has come together closer to establish G5 Sahel in 2014, which created a joint force of 5,000 troops the following year to be deployed in three border areas between Mauritania and Mali in the west, and in the joint border areas between Niger and Chad in the east, and between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in the central region. The foregoing joint forces aim to combat and counter attacks by extremist militants on Mali and the neighboring countries in the immediate vicinity and to further pursue their perpetrators across the border.



Each of the G5 Sahel countries committed to 10,000,000 euros. Driven by such efforts, the success still requires considerable international support and more concerted efforts. UN Secretary-General, Mr. Antonio Guterres, warned that the joint forces of the G5 Sahel would not be able to stop the spread of terrorism in West Africa, and that a more resolute collective response is critically needed and that the international community should work out methods to fully support the G5 Sahel. Mr. Guterres regretted that he had not been able to meet the request of the G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad) to include their joint forces under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

At the recent African Summit in Niger, the host country called on the participating countries to adopt the idea of forming an international coalition to fight the Boko Haram Group in Africa, which can be very much similar to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. However, the conclusions and recommendations at the Summit were less than expected.

**International Support to the Community of G5 Sahel**

The international community has provided support to the G5 Sahel, with the EU making a contribution of 100, 000,000 euros to the military force, and 8,000,000,000 euros to support the development of the G5 Sahel between 2014 and 2020. A summit was held in Brussels in 2018 with 60 international delegations, including 25 heads of state and government,

to further push for political and military support for the G5 Sahel force, and the necessary funds for its launch, initially estimated at 250, 00,000 euros, then at least 60, 000,000 euros a year.

Of great note, the Saudi support is the most generous for financing the war on terror in the G5 Sahel. The Kingdom has donated € 200,000,000 in two installments.

The US support is mostly evident in intelligence and logistical support, and security coordination for the African-led Multinational Joint Task Force, made up of Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroon, all countering and combating Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

France played the most prominent and vital role on the battlefield; France intervened militarily in Mali in 2012. Then a military operation followed in the region known as BARKHAN. However, it could not counter entirely terrorism alone, and rushed to the initiative to form a joint military force of the armies of the G5 Sa-


concerns, and other reasons that may be less effective.

**Obstacles to G5 Sahel Forces**

Two of the most significant obstacles to addressing the threat of terrorism in the region are: funding and concerns associated with troops, while other reasons may be deemed less influential.

**1. Financing**

The five countries participating in the force do not have the financial potential to complete the necessary funding; a reality which traps them into a spate of serious challenges affecting their future. Therefore, many countries provided generous funding, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with 200,000,000 euros; followed by the European Union 10,000,000; the United States 60, 000,000; France 58000,000; the UAE 30,000,000 in addition to



hel Member Countries. To this end, it held Paris Summit in December 2017.

Two of the most significant obstacles to addressing the threat of terrorism in the region are two main obstacles: funding and troop

other countries.

**2. Obsessions**

Regional and international reservations have arisen regarding this military force, and were mostly manifested through the following:

(A) Preventing the US veto at the UN Security Council level. Washington has made a strong reservation on it and has rejected a request by the Secretary-General of the G5 Sahel to the Security Council to grant power to the necessary logistics.

(B) Algeria viewed this force with suspicion; French and American security and military activity in the region is a threat to its interests and influence.

(C) The reluctance of the countries of the region to take the initiative, and some of them expressed disinterest in the formation of force because of the reluctance of the West to provide financial support to counter terrorism.

(D) Not taking into account successful counter-terrorism experiments in the region, such as the Mauritanian army's battles with terrorists through the Special Intervention Forces, which include between 200 and 300 soldiers deployed in small units carrying out long-term missions in the vast desert across Mauritania-Mali broder.

#### **Consequences of Confrontation**

The failure of regional security in countering the increasingly growing terrorism has become glaringly evident; likewise, it was obvious in the call made by Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou to create an international coalition to eliminate terrorist groups.

This has been also referred to by a UN and international official. In addition to the stalemate or sluggishness in the confrontation, the terrorist organizations have become the fastest movement towards the merger or large federations (the Federation of Terrorism) to unite their efforts and coordinate their operations across the countries of the region.

It is noteworthy that signs of coordination between Daesh and Al-Qaeda have emerged in the African section, as opposed to the existing hostility between Daesh and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

The fact that Daesh elements infiltrated and migrated to the region has led to increased interest in the region and increased terrorist activity. The G5 Sahel force is a model for a regional system that aims and seeks to address a major challenge, facing regional intersections, international tensions, and logistical and financing difficulties. To this end, it is necessary to create an international environment and realize consensus on its mandate and work according to acceptable input, including: finding regional support for the operations of the G5 Sahel forces in coordination with the neighboring countries and understanding their security concerns and interests. This also include cooperation and consensus with

major countries concerned in the region to ensure that no conflicts of interest and disruption of business shall be observed. The mandate and objectives include providing the international and legal umbrella to the G5 Sahel force, and its actions locally and globally. In addition, securing the necessary resources and funds through international coordination is also vital to the action. Equally important,

**It is critically noteworthy to underscore the fact that the military solution is not the only effective treatment to eliminate terrorist organizations and eradicate terrorism, but should be accompanied by political reform and economic development, or national reconciliation to remove the reasons leading up to emergence or growth in the community.**

this includes respect for the sovereignty of States and ensuring that they are partners in planning and implementation, not just a subsidiary or executive body. It is critically important to prioritize the need for the States of the region to launch operations to reaffirm its sovereignty and its important role in countering terrorism, as well as provoking hostile feelings in the event of blatant interference by a foreign state in the matter directly and

crudely.


It is critically noteworthy to underscore the fact that the military solution is not the only effective treatment to eliminate terrorist organizations and eradicate terrorism, but should be accompanied by political reform and economic development, or national reconciliation to remove the reasons leading up to emergence or growth in the community.

Foreign direct intervention in general exacerbates the problem, deepens the conflict, and raises national sensitivities to the deposits of old colonialism. Therefore, local or regional forces from the G5 Sahel should be relied upon and placed at the forefront of operations, after logistical and training support is provided. It is very important carrying out any military operations to be short-term, simply because the length of time of military operations along with the ineffectiveness of the methods of fighting terrorism is not reflected in grassroots support, which may lead up to the transformation of these organizations. It is also important to exploit Daesh infiltration into the region by splitting terrorist organizations, increasing their fragmentation, and creating a state of infighting among themselves, with a view to seek power and control exclusively, and the conflict within Boko Haram is typically a case in point.




## The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel

### Financing



### Active Areas





# Boko Haram

## AND TAKING A BET ON CONFRONTATION

■ Dr. Al-Khedher Abdul Baqi Mohammed<sup>(\*)</sup>

The first nucleus of Boko Haram was formed in 1995 in northern Nigeria as a religious and sensitization organization under the name of “Muslim Youth Organization” by a young man from Hausa called Malam Lawal. Several years later, the foregoing organization was formally re-established or rather revamped in January 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf, known as the Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad. It was based at the famous Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. However, the Movement physical presence began to take shape in 2004 after it moved to the state of Yobe on the border with Niger, where it

began its armed operations. Ever since that time, the Movement has been nicknamed by the media Boko Haram.

The emergence of Boko Haram synchronized with the establishment of Nigerian Muslim Youth Group to organize an activist movement aimed at opposing the then increasingly growing orientation towards westernized secular education, claiming that it was responsible for the deteriorating situation across Nigeria. They draw on and cite the fact that all the leaders who held the administrative positions in the country are groomed to be a product of this type of schooling and education, and that those involved in cases of corruption, collusion,

- Director of the Nigerian Center for Arab Research





malpractice, malfeasance and fraud in the country of their various political, religious and tribal affiliations are all graduates of westernized secular schools. It also believes that crimes, thefts, bribes and criminal acts are exacerbated by the increasingly growing number of graduates of these schools and universities based on the westernized secular curricula. The Movement therefore called for action with full swing and through all means to prevent the spread of such westernized secular education and clamp down on any attempts to impose it otherwise on Muslim children. The Movement nicknamed itself the Taliban of Nigeria and chanted its slogan at the first organized appearance in 2002.

#### **Factual Background to Boko Haram Emergence**

A set of motives led up to the emergence of this armed terrorist group, some of which relate to the situation prevailing in Nigeria, including but not limited to the following:

- The utter absence of an Islamic institution with a prestigious scientific reference that takes upon responsibility the formation of the scientific frameworks and cadres operating in the field of Islamic work efficiently and organizationally.
- The abject failure of the political Islam movement to offer a successful alternative to the problems of development after the religious factor came to prominence as an effective variable in the African political arena, especially the introduction of the application of Islamic Sharia to Nigeria, where – a decade after the adoption of Islamic Sharia – several factions and groups of young Muslims in more than 12 northern states in Nigeria felt that it was simply a slogan taken as a lever for political, regional and personal gain, and there has been no dramatic positive change in many aspects and

issues. Corruption, unemployment and poverty remain unsolved and are left rampant, if not increased. This development pushed some to consider finding another channel to empower Islamic rule through force and the use of weapons.

- The sectarian tension between Muslims because of the turbulent and strained relations that prevail in the African Islamic arena of the Sufi groups, on the one hand, and the Salafi scientific and jihadist groups, on the other hand; Nigeria has witnessed a bitter conflict between the parties that peaked up to fighting, aggression and the prohibition of eating sacrifices and inter-marriages as well as doing their Friday services and saying their daily congregational prayers with one another. The clashes between Sunnis and Shiites have also led to the assassination of symbols of power from both sides.
- The increasingly waning moderate official Islamic discourse or the utter absence thereof in subtle nuances and tones appropriate to the scenarios and attempts to undermine the currents of youth enthused with religion of official and foreign bodies, which generated extreme reactions to these institutions.
- The unstable and troubled political situation in the country, where the political arena is currently witnessing a state of turmoil and tension on the partisan, sectarian, tribal and other grounds, backgrounds, motives and reasons, making it such a fertile, favorable and conducive environment for the Group to grow and expand on the grounds of Islamic religious pretexts.
- Mismanagement of Nigeria's tribal, regional and ethnic pluralism, which has made it easier for leeches to exploit and employ in different circumstances and stages.

• The heated and frantic conflict between Muslims and Christians is another factor that is fueling vehemence and fervor of extremist elements of youth organizations toward armed violence. In this protracted conflict, Muslims in Africa's largest country, despite their population is greater in volume and intensity, suffer from a state of denial of education; Muslims in Africa have limited access to education, which is thus confined to Islamic culture and the Arabic language. The money of some Muslims is confiscated to purposefully enervate, weaken and paralyze them economically; this includes the destruction of mosques and the establishment of churches instead, claiming such practices are meant for urban and organizational purposes (redesigning and restructuring). More sadly, the Christian missionary activities are provided with maximum access to services, facilities, supplies and administrative support or otherwise expressed while total refusal and crackdown on Islamic charities, which Boko Haram found it a cogent justification for the practice of armed violence as a sacred religious duty.

• The glaringly poor economic and living conditions of the citizens, the state of crisis and frustration experienced by the people due to abject poverty and

underdevelopment, and the wide gap between the classes, where one third of the population suffers from hunger. Nigeria's GDP per capita is only \$300. The World Bank reports estimate 80% of the population live on \$1 a day. That is, the number of the poor exceeds 100 million.

#### **External Factors**

In addition to the internal factors in Nigeria that led to the emergence of Boko Haram, external factors also contributed to the making of this group, including, the American and European expansion in African countries, based on the colonial external ambitions in their wealth and strategic position. In this regard, attempts were made to impose direct control over the region through the direct military presence of their bases on the territory of a number of African countries such as the United States Joint Military Command for Africa (known as AFRICOM), whose mandates and objectives include but not limited analyzing information and reports on the activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the African continent.

#### **Ideology of Boko Haram**

The ideological features of the Boko Haram are based on a number of assets and principles, the most important of which include: working towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria by armed

force; calling for the immediate application of Islamic Sharia; prohibiting and forbidding work in the Government agencies and all security services, in addition to the prohibition of westernized education and manifestations of westernized culture, calling for the change of the existing system of public education in Nigeria into a system of education deeply imbued with the Arabic and Islamic culture. Boko Haram presents itself as a defender and prosecutor of Islam and Muslims, generating sympathy among simple-minded and naïve Muslim towards the Group.

#### **African Extension of Boko Haram**

Since inception, Boko Haram has been domestically oriented and managed. However, as events unfolded and followed and progress gained to prominence, it has become part of Al-Qaeda's international organization. Boko Haram Members have pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries and have joined the Sahara Emirate, which is a branch of Al-Qaeda's international organization operating in Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Mauritania and Chad. These areas have been nicknamed the "Great Desert of Islam." It is headed and led by Yahya Abu al-Hammam, Commander of Furqan Battalion.

Boko Haram has devel-

oped in the quality of its armed military operations following the coordination and training operations it received at the hands of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Countries, which has been rendered favorable and conducive by the geographical nature of the areas where it is based: the arid and treeless desert makes it too difficult to be monitored, which facilitates the process of penetration and infiltration. In addition, the border is mostly open because of tribal overlap and ethnic extension that made it difficult to identify the number of Boko Haram militants in Nigeria, or the number of Al-Shabab Movement fighters in Somalia, as well as jihadist groups in Mali's Azawad Province, to which groups of some other organizations are flocking under the pretext of succor, rescue, support and salvation of those who share with them their thought and orientation.

#### **Government Response to Boko Haram**

Official responses by the federal authorities in Nigeria to confront Boko Haram have not been sufficient as required from the outset; such government responses have relied solely on security treatment and military target operations against those elements and their sympathizers. With the passage of time, the Nigerian government realized the importance of

adopting a holistic community-based approach, involving all parties from the official government agencies and grassroots and religious bodies and others, with a comprehensive national plan covering all intellectual, political, economic, military, intelligence aspects or otherwise expressed. The plan adopted the media response, which used the various media channels that communicated with and spoke to the conscience of the Nigerian citizens, whatever their philosophical and political beliefs are, calling for condemning, countering and combating terrorism, while exposing its scandalous methods, explicit, heinous and barbaric crimes, and arousing public discontent over terrorism and the sympathizers with it.

There is also a security intelligence response, as the Nigerian security service conducts numerous security operations against elements of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. It works in tandem with international security and intelligence agencies to crack down on the Group's movements to neighboring countries in the immediate vicinity such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. It also indicates a special cooperation with the US intelligence, the US government, and the AF-RI COM Convention on Counter-Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Perhaps the most prominent attempts made by the Nigerian authorities has been the adoption of the negotiating pathway or track as they responded to national calls to open another political pathway to counter the repercussions of terrorist groups by negotiating with the elements of these organizations in attempts to persuade them to abandon violence and the practice of terrorism.

### Bukhari's Response of Boko Haram's File

The Government response to counter the Boko Haram movement has seen some improvement and positive development of the counter-offensive by the Nigerian military, as well as the efforts of the multinational joint forces, as terrorist operations have declined compared to previous years, especially with President Mohammad Bukhari

taking office since 2014. The Bukhari's Administration increased the number of soldiers; from 3,000 in 2012 to 50,000 in 2017. Some successes were realized for the Nigerian army in its fight against the Group; the Nigerian army killed its members and destroyed the rebellion bases and disrupted its logistics networks, as well as the release of hostages. The federal Government

### Why did Boko Haram emerge in Nigeria?



also entered into negotiation and paid ransoms for the release of 103 schoolgirls kidnapped from the Chibok School in 2017, and 104 other schoolgirls kidnapped from Dapchi School in 2018, and granted an amnesty for repentant Boko Haram elements.

### Taking Bets on Confrontation

In spite of this qualitative decline in the extent of the terrorist operations of Boko Haram, the real bet for confronting extremism and radical ideas lies in

the holistic approach and reliance on the basic formative approaches of the individual and identifying the revealing grounds and the real and telling reasons that feed this phenomenon. While limiting the escalation of this phenomenon requires a holistic approach, the adoption of educational methods that allow the individual to be immunized against any extremist or violent thought, making him or her believe in dialogue, difference and tolerance, is a vital approach to coun-

tering this phenomenon. One of these stakes is to pay more attention to aspects of real investment in human development, especially in the north-east of the country, and address the most important problems and issues that formed the springboard for joining the extremist and violent movements, such as poverty, marginalization, isolation and other weaknesses exploited by ideological and other currents imbibed with extremism.

# SPOTLIGHTS ON THE 2019 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

The Global Peace Index (GPI) 2019 is an annual report that measures and ranks the relative position of 163 independent states into nine global regions according to their varying levels of peacefulness. The idea of the GPI was first conceived and formed by Australian technology entrepreneur and philanthropist Steve Killelea. The GPI is now produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) in Sidney. The GPI reveals that it is very difficult to propose an exhaustive or inclusive definition of peacefulness. For the GPI, however, peace can be best measured by identifying the level of harmony scaled and weighted between passive peacefulness (absence of violence and subsequent fear) and positive peacefulness (peace prevailing in communities). The thirteenth edition of the GPI report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 30th on the GPI. Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world, and it recorded a very slight improvement in peacefulness after several years of deterioration. 22 of the 36 European countries recorded improvements on the 2019 GPI. Of the 23 GPI indicators, 8 recorded an improvement, 12 had a deterioration, with the remaining three indicators not registering any change over the past year. Peacefulness improved on average on both the Safety and Security and Militarization domains, with a small deterioration on the Ongoing Conflict domain. The Militarization domain had the largest improvement of the three GPI domains. 72 countries reduced their level of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the 2019 GPI, with the majority of the largest improvements occurring in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and the MENA. Despite the overall improvement on the Safety and Security domain, there were a number of indicators that deteriorated, including the perceptions of criminality and incarceration rate indicators.

### GPI Trends

- The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by 3.78 per cent since 2008. Over that period, 81 countries deteriorated in peacefulness, while 81 improved.
- Sadly enough, the gap between the least and most

### About the 2019 GPI

#### About the 2019 GPI

The GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators and measures the state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarization.

The first domain involves existing domestic and international conflicts. The second domain includes measuring the level of harmony and disparity among the social classes. The third domain is militarization.

peaceful countries continues to grow.

- Unfortunately, conflict in the Middle East has been the key driver of the global deterioration in peacefulness.
- Ongoing Conflict deteriorated by 8.7 per cent and Safety and Security deteriorated by just over four per cent. However, Militarization improved by 2.6 per cent.
- The indicator with the most widespread deterioration globally was the terrorism impact indicator. Just over 63 per cent of countries recorded increased levels of terrorist

activity. However, the number of deaths from terrorism has been falling globally since 2014.

- Deaths from conflict rose by 140% since 2008. However, since the peak in 2014, conflict deaths have fallen by 26.5%.
- Despite a fall in peaceful-

ness globally, there have been increases in average feelings of life satisfaction and wellbeing, perceptions of safety, and confidence in the local police and military.

- Trends in negative personal feelings more closely match the trend in peacefulness. Perceptions of stress, worry, and sadness have risen on average.
- Perception of leadership in the world's most influential countries has been declining. Confidence in US leadership has fallen the most in the past five years, with people now having more confidence in China

- An estimated 971 million people live in areas with high or very high climate change exposure. Of this number, 400 million (41 per cent) reside in countries with already low levels of peacefulness.

### Impact of violence and terrorism on global economy

The impact of violence on global economy decreased for the first time since 2012, dropping by 3.3% or \$475 billion from 2017 out of \$14 trillion. The global economic impact of violence was \$14.1 trillion PPP in 2018, equivalent to 11.2% of global GDP or \$1,853 per person. The improvement in the global economic impact of violence is largely due to the decrease in the impact of Armed Conflict particularly in Iraq, Colombia and Ukraine, where the impact of Armed Conflict decreased by 29% to \$672 billion in 2017. The economic impact of terrorism recorded the largest percentage improvement in 2018, down by 48% from 2017. Syria, Afghanistan and the Central African Republic incurred the largest economic cost of violence in 2018 as a percentage of their GDP, equivalent to 67, 47 and 42% of GDP, respectively. In the ten countries most affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 35% of GDP, compared to 3.3% in the ten least affected.

# The Black Legacy of Terrorism

## Are Daesh Families Victims or Criminals?

■ Editorial Team

The so-called state of Daesh has come to the precipice of demise; if not so, then it is almost over, leaving a bitter legacy, including thousands of women and children from Daesh families, who all have become a global dilemma that is casting a black and heavy shadow over the entire international community and is expected to echo through the ages, especially women and children of foreign fighters who fought with Daesh from outside Iraq and Syria, while their countries refuse to receive and reintegrate them.

There is no accurate count of Daesh families, yet they are of a pressing concern to the world. According to European Commission Statistics, more than 42,000 foreign fighters joined terrorist organizations between 2011 and 2016, and about 5,000 are believed to be from Europe.

About 9,000 Daesh fighters have been captured in Syria. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 90% of the displaced people living in Al-Houl camp in northern Syria are women and children, and 65% of the population of the same camp, with about 13,000 tents are under 12 years of age, including 3,000 unaccompanied children!



**More than 90% of the population of Al-Houl camp in northern Syria, with about 13,000 tents, are women and children, and 65% are under 12 years of age, including 3,000 unaccompanied children.**

In the camps allocated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria to non-Syrian and non-Iraqi women, who were leftovers of Daesh, so to speak; 12,000 women and children of 46 nationalities and thousands of them are still outside the camps. UNICEF estimates that there are 29,000 foreign fighters in Syria, with two-thirds coming from Iraq. The media official of the SDF reveals that there are 8,000 children of a father and mother from Daesh. He told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that 800 children and women would be taken out of Al-Houl camp on bail by tribal elders and notables from Raqqa and Tabqa.

After the liberation of Mosul from Daesh control and the capture of their families, the Iraqi authorities arrested 1,800 children and women from various countries such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, China, Thailand, European countries and other countries. While Daesh families were isolat-

**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: More than 55,000 men, women and children are under arrest on suspicion of being Daesh fighters in Iraq and Syria, including foreign fighters from nearly 50 countries.**

ed in private camps outside the cities, foreign families were transferred to

Tasfirat Rusafa Prison, where the Anti-Terrorism Court was established. Iraq received 600 women and children from Syria for trial in Iraq. In the same vein, the Iraqi Government set up a central investigative court on the Karkh side of Baghdad to hear their cases. Of these, 100 women and children were released because they had not been substantiated and were therefore deported to their countries, while 500 others were awaiting the results of their investigations. The detainees include more than 30 women and chil-

**European countries reserve the names and statements of Daesh families and set conditions that are difficult to meet for the children they recover.**

dren of US nationality, 25 women and children of French nationality, 18 British citizens, and fewer from Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and other countries.

At the opening ceremony of the 41st Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on June 24, 2019, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, revealed the arrest of more than 55,000 men, women and children suspected of being Daesh fighters in Iraq and Syria. Most of these individuals are Syrian or Iraqi, but include foreign fighters from nearly 50 countries. Bachelet also stated that more than 11,000 family members of suspected foreign Daesh fighters were still being detained in Al-Houl camp in northeastern Syria.

#### **Ambivalent Attitudes**

The problem of Daesh families of Iraqi or Syrian citizenship may be easier to address in the context of a national reconciliation involving the prosecution of

those involved in crimes, but the complex problem lies with Daesh families who are not Iraqis or Syrians; many of their countries refuse to receive them. Despite the flicker of hope that this problem will be addressed by the consensus of the European countries on the need to reintegrate children under the age of 10, the implementation of such consensus has not yet come to light! Few children have been recovered, and European countries reserve the names and statements of Daesh families and impose conditions on the children they recover, including proof that one parent is European, supported by conclusive evidence, such as the survival of a parent. Such conditions are difficult for thousands of children born of transnational marriages and are not documented by marriage contracts or fixed identities of spouses, and their nationalities and other documents remain non-compliant with current laws, which further complicate this thorny and labyrinthine issue. The Daesh family crisis is part of a larger crisis: the return of Daesh fighters to their countries after the defeat of Daesh and the demise of their would-be state, which is an issue contested by the allies who fought and overthrew Daesh.

After his sudden decision to accept the return of American Daesh of men, women, children, sons and daughters, President Donald Trump called on European countries to follow suit with

**Many western countries refuse to reintegrate children from Daesh, fearing that they will become radicalized projects in the future, and more reject the return of women, because many of them were involved in terrorist acts.**

their Daesh citizens. However, the attitudes of the European countries on the return of their citizens who joined Daesh are ambivalent and mixed: some reject their return while others are divided into conservative and supportive of their return.


The Republic of Northern Macedonia was the first European country to have reintegrated its citizens, where seven fighters were returned and put on trial. Germany has announced that it is

**The issue of the Daesh families is multidimensional. Only those who deal with its humanitarian dimension, as international human rights organizations do, adopt their unreserved return to their home countries. While those taking into account the multiple dimensions of the issue are aware of the complexity and difficulty of working out quick and successful solutions.**

considering all options for the return of German nationals, and the German Interior Ministry reported that one-third of its 1,000 citizens, most likely to have joined Daesh in Iraq and Syria in 2013, have returned and many have been prosecuted and underwent rehabilitation programs.

In Paris, the French Justice Minister stated that France would not take any action at the moment to reintegrate the French fighters of Daesh, and it would return the fighters on the principle of (case by case). Belgium declared it would apply the same principle to Belgian children of Daesh families between the ages of 10 and 18. Turkey received 188 children between the ages





of nine months and 18 years. Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Macedonia and Chechnya received 200 children and women. France returned five orphans of the French fighters, and Kazakhstan returned 156 children. After the return of 16 and the killing of 27 Swiss Daesh fighters, Swiss Justice and Police Minister Karen Keller-Sutter was asked if there were any Swiss children involved in the case. She then replied: "Yes, we think there are children, but children are not necessarily children; there is a difference between young children and teenagers aged 15, and we know that they are hard-liners!" She referred to the situation of some women who joined Daesh in Syria and Iraq, stating that some militant women encourage men. The issue is not that easy, and we have to look at each case individually.

#### **Onerous Issue**

The challenge in the issue of Daesh families is notoriously multidimensional; those who approach their humanitarian dimension, as international human rights organizations do, adopt the unreserved return of these women and children to their countries, and those who take into account the other dimensions realize the complexity and difficulty of working out quick and successful solutions.

Human rights organizations are almost unanimous that Daesh children are more victims than criminals. International Committee of the Red Cross Chief Peter Maurer called for hundreds of foreign children of Daesh fighters in Syria to be repatriated, and Joe Baker, director of the Children Rights Division of Human Rights Watch, denounced the detention, torture and prosecution of children regardless of the participation level of such children in Daesh terror-

ist activities. This approach is glaringly unfair and will have lifelong negative consequences for many of these children. Sonia Kush, Director of the Syria Office of Save the Children, stated: "All these children who have actual or perceived links with Daesh are the victims of this conflict. The more children remain trapped and get engaged there, the more vulnerable they will be to extremism, terrorism and embrace this ideology, which requires expediting their recovery procedures and integrating them into new societies". In the same vein, "Daesh has been a top priority for the western national security for years, but now that the state has lost its territory, it is critically unfavorable to focus on what is going on there, and it is easy to draw attention to the threats rather than drawing attention to the humanitarian pressing needs" said Letta Taylor, Human Rights Watch counterterrorism official.

If it were flowing easy and smooth as envisaged by international human rights organizations, quick solutions could be worked out to this onerous and arduous issue, but many western countries are particularly reluctant to return Daesh children lest they should backfire and boomerang; they harbor suspicions and fears that such children may develop into future extremist projects. Those who refuse and reject the return of Daesh families argue that even those who were not fighters have been tainted and stigmatized by Daesh members, and their mere stay in Daesh territory was a form of support and propaganda for the Organization. They further argue that as the children are repatriated, there will be mounting pressure to repatriate non-combatants and non-militants, and then to demand and claim the fighters themselves.

There is more rejection and opposition

to the return of Daesh women than that of Daesh children; many of these women were involved in actual terrorist acts. A research study conducted by extremism expert Ross Frenett reveals that loyalty to the cause is equally strong for both men and women; women do encourage terrorist attacks. He cites the story of a female battalion founded by the Organization to impose a commitment on women to the teachings of Sharia, and to force them to a certain lifestyle and clothing in the territory controlled by the Organization in Syria. When a few of the 600 women from the battalion were asked about their practices, they replied that they tortured prisoners while serving, and that they enjoyed what they did! These convictions raise concerns that these women will be a constant source that feeds an entire generation of extremists.

While others argue that the resettlement and reintegration of Daesh women through intensive programs and watchful control is a typical, viable solution on the ground, as Germany has done with fighters and wives of fighters returning home; the judiciary issues lenient sentences and may tolerate wives. They are not prosecuted if not involved directly in terrorist acts in an effort to ensure that the suspects are better off. This is corroborated by the investigations revealed by many of the women detained, as it turned out that they were not all Daesh women, and that the percentage of this group of women among the detainees is low. In the same vein, ongoing meetings held with them have shown that many women have been lured and trapped, or have been forced to stay with their husbands, have been unable to flee and principally do not hold pro-Daesh ideas.



## IMCTC PUBLISHES A LEXICON OF TERRORISM TERMS

### ■ Editorial Team

Terminology makes up an important springboard for scientific, intellectual, cultural, and even political and security discussions. In principle, visions, insights, plans and programs are often constructed based on terminology. It should be well noted, however, that a term may render a different line of interpretation. Hence, a sense of dichotomy or ambivalence may crop up and lead up to disparity in specific connotations and general denotations. With the increasingly growing advancement of both philology

and etymology along with semantics and pragmatics, lexicography has become such an enormous work carried out by research centers and peer-reviewed scientific and academic institutions, and political and legal bodies.

The problem of terrorism demonstrates the importance of terminology and the necessity of accurate word-choice, editorial pinpoint accuracy, the mots justes, immaculate phrases, spotless terms and a clear-cut and conclusive statement.

Terrorism today is not limited to race, religion, ethnicity or sect. It is imperative, therefore, to apply appropriate scientific criteria to its concepts and associated concepts in such a manner as to make our treatment approaches aligned with a sound and solid scientific and objective basis.

### Leading Initiative

IMCTC has undertaken to launch a leading initiative as a springboard to set the course and define the scientific parameters of the work of IMCTC. To this end, IMCTC has almost given the

go-ahead to develop a comprehensive encyclopedia or scientific lexicon specialized in terrorism-related terminology acclaimed by international accreditation. Such a phenomenal project shall definitely bridge the increasingly widening lacunae in most contemporary studies; there is a glaringly uneasy dearth of such lexicons and encyclopedias that are expected to be shelved in local and international libraries. Such work will become a global scientific reference that contributes to the making of many definitions of

the exact terms in the field of terrorism and associated lexicon entries, especially for researchers in forensic, intellectual, social and military studies, and for media professionals, technicians, and economists specialized in studying the financing of terrorism.

The Lexicon shall take great care to collect all the terms related to terrorism, and to accurately edit their lexicographical entries, and to develop scientific and objective definitions thereof. The definitions shall be clearly formulated without giving rise to semantic or lexical ambiguity and in such a way as to steer clear of formulations that lead up to misunderstandings. The foregoing work shall combine the lexicography of terminology in the accuracy of expressions, terms, phrases and encyclopedic works through citing examples and explanations in a reader-friendly setting conducive to upgrading user's experience.

#### **Viable Implementation Plan**

For the purpose of implementing the initiative, IMCTC has developed a sound methodological approach and a practical plan. It has formed a group of academic professors specialized in forensic, intellectual, social, technical, media, informatics, military and security studies. The ad hoc Team has meticulously looked at all the publications issued by terrorist organizations

and individuals and collected the terms contained therein.

Given the fact that there were encyclopedias, dictionaries, lexicons and literature on topics related to the in-progress encyclopedia, the Team members need to track their indices, contents and entries in different languages to derive the terms that could be included in our work.

In the lexicographical formulation of terms, the Team members are keen to formulate such terms in an accurate, unambiguous and clear-cut scientific manner, featuring pinpoint accuracy of scientific discipline, brevity, peer-review and precision. It is of great note that the most common terms in use, synonyms and terms of high frequency for one single meaning, most commonly used terms, appropriacy, clarity and coherence shall be used for explanatory purposes. Obsolete, old-fashioned and archaic words and terms are avoided unless otherwise referred to for lexicographical set-up. References shall also be made to the taxonomy of related semantic and lexical items, including but not limited to antonymy, synonymy, denotation, connotation, euphemism, dysphemism, derivatives, etymology, hypernymy, hyponymy, taboos, metonymy, register and genre.

In the interpretation of

terms, a specialized drafting team has been formed and assigned to formulate the lexicographical interpretation of the terminology within its discipline. The Team shall formulate meaning in a sound scientific language that is clear, neutral and lucid, covering the linguistic meaning of the term, the intellectual and cultural environment in which it originated. Furthermore, the terms shall be gradually explained by reviewing the historical intellectual developments that affected its etymology and semantics. This includes shedding fresh light on the associated subtle nuances of different connotations across a linguistic trajectory of a term-specific journey to date, steering clear of any biased interpretation or loaded explanation shrouded in mystery or purposive references. The interpretation of terms shall be primarily focused on unvarnished truthfulness, neutrality and credibility. This means a term-specific interpretation shall be void of any possible implicature or entailment that mars and maims originality.

In the case of a term that may give rise to possible mixed interpretations, synchronic and diachronic considerations of cultural and linguistic differences and disparities of various times and places should be accounted for. With this in mind, the explanation

is then constructed on the denotation common and meaningful in our time, rather than on what it once used to be over a certain period of time.

#### **Necessary Precautions**

Inasmuch as the Encyclopedia terminology addresses highly sensitive issues, religious and cultural precautions and political and security reservations (taboos, faux pas, etc.) must be taken into account when properly and accurately edited to avoid possible negative, unfavorable and undesirable connotations, innuendos and implicature.

To this end, a wealth of highly experienced university professors and researchers from several countries have been commissioned to edit these terms. They have painstakingly completed the drafting phase with the first review. The Encyclopedia is currently undergoing ad hoc panel discussions where these terms are studied and reviewed. Upon completion, the work will be sent off to a number of scholars and senior professors to be peer-reviewed for approval. It should be well noted that the Encyclopedia includes four main sections according to the four domains of the IMCTC. The Encyclopedia will be published in the three working languages: Arabic, English and French and widely disseminated in all the IMCTC media platforms.

# JORDAN

## STANDS OUT TO TERRORISM MILITARY AND SOFT APPROACHES

■ Dr. Mohammed Aref Al-Azamat(\*)

**G**eographically located at the height of the storm, Jordan – over the past three decades or so – has been glaringly experiencing the dire consequences of chaos and conflict; admittedly, it is an uneasy time of unrest which such a volatile yet vulnerable region has been and is still trudging through. Left helpless in the lurch, Jordan has unwittingly slipped into the gusty yet adverse winds of terrorism and violence whipping the country up and sweeping through the region at every turn to sow venomous seeds of extremism almost everywhere. Very much similar to the neighboring Arab countries in the region, Jordan has been stormed by a spate of terrorist attacks aimed at undermining its security and stability. With terrorism being drummed up for, the magnitude of the wave of attacks has become downright frenzied with Daesh mushrooming in the immediate vicinity of Jordan. Lurking inside the evil ideologues, such an obnoxious visitor, so to speak, has covertly sneaked into the hearts of some Jordanian youth, who have been so naively decoyed, lured and tempted into swallowing the bait made up of camouflaged coercion, violence and brutality. Meanwhile, the Jordanian government has worked out a set of soft and military approaches to countering the existing and imminent terrorist threat. Only then did the Government notch up resounding successes.

- Researcher in terrorism and extremism issues, founder and former director of the Jordanian Center for Counter Extremism (JCCE)

### **Terrorist Threat to Jordan**

Heroically enough, the episodes of the Jordanian contemporary story started to take shape some years into the millennium, when the Jordanian security services foiled a fiendish plot targeting tourist sites and political and foreign figures. Following this ignominious defeat, a group of 13 people were then arrested, including two non-Jordanian terrorists: one from Iraq and one from Algeria who had previously engaged in the Afghan experience of belligerency. Flipping or flicking through the following pages of the Jordanian story, we come to narrate the 2002 assassination of USAID official Lawrence Foley in Amman by an Al-Qaeda affiliated cell. Later in April 2004, the so-called "Jayyousi" case came to prominence when the security services thwarted a plot of a large chemical attack, targeting the General Intelligence Headquarters, the US Embassy in Amman and the Premiership Headquarters.

Ahead in 2005, the first chapter of the story was sealed with three synchronic terrorist attacks using explosive belts, targeting three hotels in central Amman, claiming the lives of 57 people while injuring hundreds of others. Soon Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the operation, which has been classified by the Jordanian security ser-

vices as one of the largest and most devastating operations in Jordan's history. Swirled amid these terrorist squalls which acted like a real slap in the face to the whole world, Jordan realized that no single country was immune to the threat and evils of terrorist organizations. Sadly enough, no sooner it drew breath than did the second wave of Daesh terrorist attacks break out.

The second chapter of the terrorism story was the most dolorous, featuring terrifyingly the heartbreaking savage method of burning the Jordanian pilot Muath Kasasebeh alive by the notoriously cold-blooded terrorist organization "Daesh" in 2015; it was a downright horrendous manner that wreaked havoc deeply on the Jordanian conscience. With time tramping through 2016, Jordan again underwent a spate of traumatic incidents; a Jordanian Armed Forces officer was martyred following the storming of the house of a Daesh-affiliated cell in the city of Irbid, north of Jordan, in which 7 members of the armed terrorist cell were killed in the clash, while others were arrested. Following a series of atrocious attacks that swept through the region, 7 soldiers of the Jordanian Armed Forces were martyred and 14 others were injured when they were targeted by a booby-trap bomb car sent from the Syrian

side into the Jordanian border area at Al-Rukban. More so, a wave of terrorist operations in December 2016 were carried out in Karak; terrorists opened fire in the historic Karak Citadel, killing 10 people, including 7 security men and a Canadian tourist, while injuring 34 others. Later, members of a terrorist organization cell opened fire, which led to the death of 4 security men and gendarmerie, wounding 11 others. The Jordanian Security Forces tracked down the attackers and broke into a house in northern Karak where some members of the terrorist cell holed up. The result was that 4 security men and gendarmerie forces were martyred, while 11 others were injured, arresting a wanted terrorist and shooting dead another. Marking the end part of the second chapter was the 2018 terrorist attack, when a trained Daesh fighter bombed out a security patrol in the city of Fuheis in Balqa Region without any casualties, followed by an armed confrontation with a terrorist cell in the city of Salt, in which 5 security men were martyred and 3 terrorists were shot dead, while 5 others were arrested and tens were injured.

With thousands of Jordanian youth in robust engagement on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts, and the profound lack of a clear vision of their fate or practical arrangements for their return or

homecoming, the chapters of the story of terrorism in Jordan remain yet scalable and likely to have more stories to narrate. Given such a high likelihood, the Jordanian government has felt a dire need to adopt a holistic strategy to address the challenges that may arise in the immediate, foreseeable or not-too-distant future.

### **Military Security Approach**

Ever since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Jordanian political and security institutions have followed closely the ins and outs of the situation in Syria. In the first three years, Jordan has cautiously refrained from direct involvement in the Syrian issue, while paying attention to the humanitarian outreach programs and relief aid for Syrian refugees, including the displaced, impacted, and vulnerable people. Since 2014, however, the Iraqi and Syrian crises have overlapped as Daesh started then to sneak and infiltrate into both countries, gaining wide spread to control over large swathes of Iraq and Syria, and the declaration of the too-driving and too-burning ambition of establishment of the Islamic Caliphate to expand to the region countries in the immediate vicinity and to engulf the entire world. With such developments snowballing into the current situation, Jordan has become one of the countries most threatened by this organization, due to the geo-

graphical location adjacent to Iraq and Syria.

Given the coherence of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS under which more than 60 countries were subsumed and was spearheaded by the United States in August 2014, following mil-

**Uniquely enough, Jordan – in the face of the existing and potential threat constituted by ISIS – has developed a so-called “cushion policy” by establishing a network of security and social relations with tribes, clans, notable and actors in western Iraq and southern Syria, in such a fashion as to purposefully enfeeble, enervate and devitalize Daesh and depriving it of the grassroots incubator.**

itary strikes on ISIS positions both in Iraq and Syria, Jordan has felt the overpowering urge to officially join such an entity. With the full membership granted to Jordan, the Jordan Air Force aircrafts have been involved since 23 September 2014, along with the United States and a handful of other countries to carry out airstrikes against ISIS’s vital targets over ISIS-held control areas in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, Abu Kamal, Hassakeh, and some other areas in the general vicinity. This was meant to eradicate and annihilate

the organization’s fighters and destroy its command headquarters and training centers, along with its supply areas, logistics, weapons, arsenals and equipment stores.

In the same vein, Jordan has provided intelligence and logistical support to the parties of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, such as providing facilities, military bases and airports necessary to carry out airstrikes on the organization’s target sites in Syria and Iraq. Jordan’s air bases were the main launching pad for US, British and French aircraft in striking the organization’s targets in Syria, while the Jordanian intelligence services exchanged information with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS member countries on the covert movements of the organization’s leaders and members.

Uniquely enough, Jordan – in the face of the existing and potential threat constituted by ISIS – has developed a so-called “cushion policy” by establishing a network of security and social relations with tribes, clans, notables and actors in western Iraq and southern Syria. Ever since the ubiquitous expansion of the foregoing organization in Iraq, Jordan has worked to attract and develop its relations with the Sunni tribes in Anbar in such a fashion as to purposefully enfeeble, enervate and devitalize the Organization and depriving it of the grassroots incubator

which it openly and proudly boasts of, while setting up an insurmountable barrier to the organization’s ambitions to expand beyond the Jordanian territory. To the Iraqis’ succor, Jordan has as always provided intelligence and training support to the Iraqi government while combating and countering ISIS. Speaking of Syria, Jordan has established solid relations with tribes, clans and actors in southern Syria and built alliances there that would contribute to strengthening the role of the Free Army, while controlling the trajectory of the military operation in Horan and weakening the presence or even ubiquity of ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra in such areas. The alliances went far away to include expansion into the countryside of Deir Ezzor and the eastern region of Syria, adjacent to the Rukban Camp where ISIS once reigned over the whole province. Impressively, the “cushion policy” proved successful in providing conducive and favorable conditions for the protection of Jordanian national security. Reflecting on the deeply held conviction, Jordan has felt the enormous importance of the Russian leading role in Syria. To this end, and in an effort to establish “de-escalation” zones on the Jordanian-Syrian border, Jordan has opened up close cooperation to the Russian side in concert with the United States to find alternative

arrangements in southern Syria that best serve Jordan’s national security.

It was in July 2017 that Jordan reached an agreement with the United States and Russia on sensible arrangements to support a ceasefire in southwestern Syria. Accordingly, and as stated in the foregoing multilateral agreement, they called a halt to ceasefire along the lines of contact under the agreement of the Syrian government and associated forces on the one hand, and the Syrian armed opposition forces on the other. The critically important agreement has made up a quantum leap towards a permanent “de-escalation” zone in southern Syria, ending hostilities, appalling atrocities, restoring stability and allowing humanitarian access to this vulnerable and impacted area of Syria. In late August 2017, Jordan and Russia announced that the Amman Center was put into action to monitor the ceasefire agreement in southern Syria.

#### **Soft Approach**

The Amman Message was the first intellectual approach adopted by the Jordanian government in the fight against terrorism; a detailed statement issued by King Abdullah II, dated November 9, 2004. The aim of the Amman Message is to well explain the true essence of Islam and to showcase that widely-adopted tolerance of Islam and to-



tally-rejected extremism are poles apart. The Amman Message reemphasizes the sanctity, inviolability and sacredness of human life and the inadmissibility of attacks on peaceful civilians and their property. It spells out that the terrorist acts carried out by few Muslims are contrary to the real essence of Islam.

Based on the Amman Message, an internal Islamic dialogue was established among a wealth of Muslim scholars, which principally came up with a three-point agreement known as the contents of the Amman Message. It is primarily re-

peoples and religions; it is an initiative endorsed by a wealth of prominent Muslim scholars under the auspices of the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, aimed at defining a common platform for dialogue and

**Any effective approach to countering terrorism should be based on two main pillars: understanding the nature of terrorism and emphasizing the intellectual, security and military dimensions in the face of terrorism.**

addressed the common denominator between Christianity and Islam.

In September 2007, the final version of the Document was presented at the conference under the auspices of King Abdullah II held by the Royal Academy of the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought titled "Love in the Holy Quran." The conferees agreed that the commonalities between Islam and Christianity, which make up the ideal springboard for interfaith dialogue and understanding, is love of Allah, love of neighbor and love of good.

In September 2010, King

the pioneering work of the Common Word Initiative and on the concepts of love of Allah, love of neighbor and love of good.

Finally, in 2014, the Jordanian government prepared a national plan to counter extremism in the wake of the expansion of extremism and terrorism. The plan defines the responsibilities of different ministries and institutions to achieve effective control of extremism. The National Plan to Combat Extremism identifies three main frameworks as the pillars for the intellectual treatment of the culture of extremism. First Framework: Establishing a true Islamic religious culture based on the purposes of the tolerant Islamic Sharia. Second Framework: Promoting a community culture based on political pluralism and respect for public freedoms and civil rights. Third Framework: Establishing of the values of tolerance, inclusion and acceptance of the other.

In conclusion, it can be stated that any effective approach to countering terrorism should be based on two main pillars. First, it is critically important to understand the nature of terrorism. Second, it is critically important to emphasize the intellectual, security and military dimensions in the face of terrorism, while reviewing national plans and initiatives based on national interests.



lated to the adoption of an ambiguous and comprehensive definition of a Muslim in the framework of the different schools and sects of thought and faith the scholars of which have come to an agreement that the followers of such schools and sects are all Muslims and should not be looked down at as disbelievers.

The Common Word Initiative was the second intellectual approach that sought to promote a culture of harmony and peace between

relations between Muslims and Christians. The Initiative came in an open message in which 38 Muslim scholars responded in October 2006 to Pope Benedict XVI's keynote speech, in which scholars of all Muslim groups spoke one language about the true teachings of Islam. A year later, scholars expanded their message. 138 scholars from all Islamic schools of thought and schools met to announce the document, Common Word Between Us and You, which

Abdullah II launched the Interfaith Harmony Week Initiative before the United Nations General Assembly to encourage people in general and the youth in particular to embrace the noble principles of tolerance and coexistence. Less than a month after the launch of the Initiative, the United Nations unanimously adopted it, marking the first week of February as the Interfaith Harmony Week. The idea of the Interfaith Harmony Week Initiative is based on

# Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing



## ■ Dr. Mohammed Hamed Al-Fayed<sup>(\*)</sup>

In terms of criminology, money laundering ranks among the most serious financial crimes, constituting negative effects equally on the economy and society. Money laundering per se is the common ground for all types of crimes and illegal activities, including the financing of terrorism. To better explain the existing link between money laundering and terrorism, we need to bring to focus the historical trajectory of the phenomenon itself, and further clarify the associated concepts along with the different stages and the methods used therein, in addition to uncovering its effects and the approaches used to address money laundering.

- Economic Researcher

### **Historical Trajectory**

Historical studies reveal that the term money laundering first gained circulation in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The US security officials used money laundering to denote a criminal activity, which the mafia gangs used to carry out, including setting up laundries and cleaner's shops to invest and conceal the money they had obtained through illegal methods such as drug trafficking. As such, income accruing from illicit trade was included in the daily revenues of laundries, which together with the revenues were taxed. It was therefore said that the profits of the illicit trade were laundered. By analogy, as unclean clo-

thes are washed and laundered to be usable and wearable, funds created out of criminal activities are likewise washed and laundered to be appropriate for circulation.

It is hard however to confirm that money laundering in this criminal form began in the United States. It was reported that the first people to have carried out money laundering were the gangsters in ancient China, where trade and the profits accruing were used as a means of camouflaging and concealing crime funds in the palaces of rulers, while diverting the eyes of the police and the authorities off identifying the reality of wealth of some families who used trade to screen such

money crime off the public, especially crimes of robbery and seizure of peasant money.

### **Revealing & Telling Definitions**

The term money laundering, commonly used by many legislative and executive bodies today, may seem unclear and vague.

The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) defines money laundering as a set of measures aimed at concealing the real source of money and property derived from criminal acts, legitimizing these funds, and then re-injecting them into the economy.

The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) explains that money laundering is a process used by criminals to conceal the illegal source of money resulting from criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, extortion and fraud, counterfeiting and forging, the sale of illegal weapons, theft and bribery, robbery and smuggling, prostitution, electronic fraud and tax evasion and the like. Money launderers seek to hide the source of such illicit funds to legitimize and freely use them.

### **Steps and Stages**

Money laundering goes through three stages:

First Stage is the recruitment or replacement phase, which consists in attempting to introduce funds derived from crimes and illegal activities into the financial and banking system.

Second Stage is the coverage phase, which is based on a series of financial and banking operations aimed at obliterating the sources of illicit funds, and then separating them from their sources.

Third Stage is the consolidation and integration phase, in which these funds are re-injected into the economy to be legitimate.

Money laundering makes a number of

gains for criminals. Money laundering per se is a viable means of distancing themselves from the suspicion of criminal activities generating funds, while avoiding prosecution and litigation, ensuring that they retain and possess such funds and not confiscating them, and re-investing them in illicit activities and acts such as the financing of terrorism.

### **Means & Tools**

The means of money laundering are notoriously driven by continuous change and innovation. Admittedly, the state-of-the-art technology has contributed to the sophisticated development of money laundering, bringing about new financial and banking innovations and instruments, as well as measures of financial liberalization and globalization, and the depth of integration between financial and banking systems across borders. Given the international nature of money laundering operations and the fact that they are not bound by geographical boundaries, a large number of financial and banking institutions from different countries are often involved in one operation. The most important means used in money laundering are the following:

- Establishing companies and institutions of a business or service nature with a view to opening accounts with banks and depositing illicit cash, as if they were the result of legitimate activity.
- Fragmentation of deposit operations by dividing and chunking large amounts into a number of small amounts, depositing them in different methods, and distributing them to several cities and at different times in such a way so that it is difficult to note the large volume of cash deposited.
- Acquisition of precious commodities

such as antiques, jewelry, rare paintings, real estate and luxury cars; the value for such items is paid in cash. Following the acquisition of such highly valuable possessions, they sell them for bank deeds (checks) deposited in banks without raising any suspicion. Such business is not aimed at making profit, because the owners are readily willing to sell for less than the purchase price and bear the losses to hide the sources of their money.

- Investment in foreign currencies and commodities traded on the stock exchange; the purchase and sale transactions are processed in cash, and the collection of value by bank instruments can be easily deposited in banks.
- Collusion with banks and governments that turn a blind eye to money laundering, and provide the confidentiality required for account holders to achieve common interests.
- Terrorist financing uses the same previous means. Of great note, the sources of funds for terrorist financing are not necessarily illegal, whereas the sources of funds for money crimes are inevitably illegal.

### **Effects and Consequences**

Money laundering has negative macroeconomic effects. Its spread in an economy undermines the authorities' ability to adequately implement macroeconomic policies, due to the lack of credibility of available economic data and statistics, in the absence of measuring and forecasting the scale of such operations. In addition, severe fluctuations in the movement of money, deposits and flows associated with money laundering affect the stability of the money market and the foreign exchange market. Furthermore, the impact of money laundering and related criminal activities should

not be neglected in disturbing the distribution of resources and wealth in the economy. One of the negative effects of money laundering is that illicit activities mushroom and flourish rapidly, such as drug trafficking, administrative and financial corruption and others, which contribute to the destruction of the social and moral environment of the world countries.

### **Combating and Countering**

Anti-money-laundering efforts and combating money-laundering activities should not be only seen as the responsibility of anti-crime agencies, but should also be seen as of general importance for financial stability. This has come to increasingly growing prominence in recent years as the annual growth in money laundering through the global financial and banking system, estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at between US \$ 600 billion and US \$ 1.5 trillion, which accounts for about 20% to 50% of output. Global money laundering is estimated by other reports at \$ 2.8 trillion.

The issues of combating money laundering, terrorist financing and illicit activities have received increasing attention in recent years by various international political, economic and banking actors. In 1989, the Group of Seven (G7) established the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which aims to educate the world countries on the dangers of money laundering and issue recommendations and review money laundering trends on a continuous basis to take measures to combat them, and meticulously monitor progress in the application of these measures and procedures.

The G7 provided forty guidelines, which have become the main focus of anti-money laundering plans and

procedures. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the G7 added eight new recommendations, in the wake of the emerging threat of terrorist financing. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued papers and guidelines in line with the 40 recommendations, which included precise procedures to identify customers to enhance the credibility of the banking system and prevent it from being used for illegal purposes.

It is equally important to note that this international activity in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing was not limited to institutions, organizations and groups concerned with economic, financial and banking activities, but also included other stakeholders and competent authorities; in addition to the UN and its various programs, there are other anti-crime organizations such as Interpol.

The Islamic States have been particularly keen to cooperate with the international efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of illicit activities, including terrorism, and working on the implementation of international standards and recommendations. Furthermore, the Islamic States have introduced legislation to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and established national committees and bodies and units concerned with the follow-up policies to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Comprehensive guidelines and directives have been issued to financial and banking institutions on the requirements of these operations to reduce their risks, in addition to conducting many seminars and training workshops and campaigns to promote awareness of money laundering and terrorism financing issues.





## QUARTERLY ISSUE HERALDS AND MARKS MOMENTOUS LAUNCH

Colonel Hassan bin Suliman Al-Amri

The IMCTC member countries, akin to the rest of the world countries, have experienced a spate of terrorist incidents aimed at threatening and undermining stability, decoying such countries to slide into chaos, terrorizing people, plotting and carrying out assassinations, vandalizing private and public property while committing acts of evil. As a matter of fact, these are catastrophic consequences of such glaringly evil and dark thought deeply ingrained in a deviant approach, flouting all conventions, norms and rules of religion and faith (all religions and faiths); it is such a gloomy thought void of any sublime methods and principles. In this regard, driven by such a strong willpower, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's call to the 41 member countries of IMCTC was readily and highly acclaimed. Such a quantum leap has been successfully translated by the establishment of IMCTC, amid a set of difficult circumstances continually witnessed by the whole world. Admittedly, the IMCTC member countries have always suffered from the scourge of terrorism. Terrorism per se is a scourge. Hence, the role with which IMCTC is mandated comes into play at the proper time and place.

The IMCTC member countries fully recognize their influential role in the international community as much as they care for national security. Likewise, the IMCTC member countries are fully aware that countering terrorism requires international concerted cooperation against harboring terrorist elements and groups and preventing them from exploiting the territory of some of the countries in which they live and providing a nurturing environment as an incubator for their use as a springboard for their activities. Here at the headquarters of the secretariat-general along with associated various departments, sections and units, we work in full swing to set the wheels in motion and move towards a horizon that brings us much closer to one another – by the support, guidance and assistance conferred by Allah – through an integrated collective action adopting a multi-pronged approach in the fight against terrorism across a four-domain emphasis of ideological, communications, financial and military initiatives focused on the values of sovereignty, coordination and participation. To this end and on such a momentous occasion and within the media and communications domain, IMCTC has released several publications that will see the light very soon. Among the most prominent publication is the IMCTC Magazine, *At-Tahalof*. The first issue thereof is being published to herald and mark the momentous launch and will continue thereafter periodically to contribute to fostering awareness and sensitization while welcoming different and varying opinions and views to be fully voiced and expressed in constructive, insightful, lively, thoughtful, objective and wide-ranging discussions.

# AtTAHALOF

IMCTC Quarterly Magazine

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التحالف الإسلامي العسكري لمحاربة الإرهاب

ISLAMIC MILITARY COUNTER TERRORISM COALITION



General Directorate of Planning and Coordination

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