Terrorism is something that happens to others” is a mythical catchphrase frequently repeated by the Mauritanians in the early 1990s, when the evils of terrorism ballooned and snowballed into a global ghost-like inferno that spreads chaos and fear ubiquitously, threatening the survival and existence of countries and the security of people, and tampering with their stability. The statement was based on geographic, cultural and historical justifications:
Geographically, Mauritania is far from the conflict areas caused by terrorism in the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, even though a few Mauritanians joined the fighting in these areas. Culturally and historically, it is clear through the unity of religion and thought of the Mauritanian people, who have remained monotheistic, combined by one ideology and religion. Throughout its history, Mauritania is not home to “murderous identities” that have sprouted up in many countries. In a similar vein, the Mauritanian scholars in their fatwas were more inclined towards reformist positions, avoiding every statement or action leading to bloodshed or murders even in their confrontation with the French colonizers. They believed that Jihad is best practiced with good examples and good words far much better than brandishing weapons at the other.
TILTING THE BALANCE
That statement remained a deeply ingrained myth on which decision-makers depend, and was thus adopted by many notables of the country, even with the outbreak of terrorism across the cities of Algeria, with the evils of the scourge of war targeting the hotels of Casablanca and Marrakech, and the rising fumes that silenced and blocked the noses from the World Trade Center. It is then when the “Maghiti’s attack” turned things upside down.
At the beginning of June 2005, Mauritania was suffering from an unstable political situation, as the pillars of the ruling political system were shaken at the impact of a suffocating political crisis; the funds of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi contributed to sowing its root causes, as he funded political movements that were accused at the time of attempting to overthrow the regime.
With the Mauritanian security preoccupied with domestic danger, an army unit was stationed at a border gap less trodden in the depth of the Sahara labyrinths, a few kilometers off the border with Algeria, dozens of soldiers turned a dilapidated ramshackle colonial fortress into a center-point to control the borders, in a remote area where only few of smugglers, traffickers, herdsmen and the “Nimadi” tribes who have been hunting deer with their trained hounds for centuries.
One idyllic desert-like autumn evening, the army unit, which was cut off from the world, received a vehicle with Mauritanians on board who were reported that they were shepherds left marooned and their truck broke down; they needed water, fuel, and food. It is customary and an essential part of the Sahara traditions to showcase hospitality to others, the Almoravids – alternatively known as Al-Murabitun – were magnanimous, munificent and generous to their guests at the borders and spared no efforts to act accordingly. They treated them tea and bread, repaired their car and gave them water and food. The men camouflaged and decoyed as shepherds turned out to be a surveillance patrol working for the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” that has been active in Algeria since the 1990s. It has been involved in terrorist attacks and killed thousands of Algerians. Over the course of time, the group decided to expand regionally and pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda, which was nicknamed later “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”. Given the fact that the Mauritanian soldiers are best known for their hospitality, keen to honor and look up to their guests, the reconnaissance battalion seized the opportunity to surreptitiously learn more about the place, combed for the strengths and weaknesses of the military unit defenses and located the communications device led by the army.
On the fourth day of June 2005 after dawn prayer, the detachment returned with dozens of fighters who were hiding behind the sand dunes and launched a violent and sudden attack on the military unit; they destroyed the communications apparatus and engaged into a direct confrontation with the “barracks of Maghiti” that confronted the Al-Qaeda fighters with great valor, killing one and injuring several others, but the military unit, consisting of 17 Mauritanian soldiers, was completely destroyed. Maghiti’s attack caused a great shock to the Mauritanians, as it refuted the deeply ingrained myth that reads “terrorism is something that happens to others”. The terrorist attack led to major political and security repercussions, which ended with the fall of the regime of President Muawiya Weld Al-Taya in less than two months.
INEVITABLE CONFRONTATION
The awareness of the Mauritanian government and army at that time fell short, trudging late given the magnitude of the dangers that were terribly growing along the borders of Mali and Algeria. Al-Qaeda made alliances with some of the local population in northern Mali, while its sleeper cells were expanding covertly inside Mauritania to create a larger affiliation that would provide Al-Qaeda battalions in northern Mali with fighters of young Mauritanians decoyed and fooled by slogans, such as “jihad” and “support for Islam”, while Al-Qaeda was working on laying the foundations of a “rogue state” amid the desert.
After the fall of Ould Taya’s regime, it became clear that Mauritania was drumming up for a war on terrorism that did not choose the appropriate time or place for it. The lessons the Mauritanian army learnt in the war on terrorism highlighted officers who quickly seized control to confront “Al-Qaeda” readily and courageously spearheaded by President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El-Ghazwani. Terrorist operations in Mauritania continued, targeting new army positions on the border in “Turin” and “Al-Ghalwiyya”, in which dozens of soldiers were killed. A suicide attack targeted the French embassy in Nouakchott, French tourists were killed, clashes took place between security and Al-Qaeda in the heart of Nouakchott and Mauritanian security valiantly thwarted many terrorist attacks.
After 2008, when Mauritania was witnessing a ferociously escalating wave of terrorist attacks, the authorities began developing a national strategy to combat terrorism; the political, security and legal leaders, social activists, intellectuals and religious scholars participated in drawing out its features. Against a backdrop of strategic transition, Mauritania made tremendous strides from the “reaction” stage to the “initiative stage” against Al-Qaeda.
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
The Mauritanian strategy looks meticulously into the different dimensions and manifestations of terrorism. It well understands that the phenomenon cannot be confined to one dimension, nor is it wise to look into it from one perspective; rather, it is a complex and labyrinthine phenomenon, the root causes and trends of which are very much similar. The Mauritanian strategy has attempted to bring together the security and development trends, and to put into action diplomacy to realize these goals. Principally, the Mauritanian strategy falls into four equal main axes: legal, security and military, political and diplomatic and cultural and religious.
LEGAL AXIS
This axis seeks to develop a new legal arsenal, which can confront terrorism and dry up its sources of financing, in such a manner as to make the Mauritanian criminal law dance to the tune of this new phenomenon, and keeps pace with developments in international law in this field. Mauritania has reviewed and revisited many laws to be in harmony with the Mauritanian counterterrorism law issued in 2010, and has enacted new laws to fill legal loopholes.
To this end and to dry up the sources of terrorist financing, the counterterrorism measures in place have tightened the noose to and clamped down on money laundering funneled to terrorists, who gained millions of dollars from the hostage trade. Mauritania also introduced financial monitoring bodies specialized in following-up, controlling and restricting such financiers, and investigation and prosecution were put into action against those involved. In the counterterrorism multilateral framework, Mauritania also coordinates with many regional and international bodies and organizations.
SECURITY AND MILITARY AXIS
Security and military actions are the backbone of every national, regional, or international strategy for countering terrorism, whether it is preemptive actions (intelligence action), or aftermath-action (deterrence and attack). The Mauritanian strategy has given priority to intelligence, simply because it is a preemptive action that prevents terrorist attacks, or even the creation of sleeper cells in the country. Mauritania has well used many agencies working in this field such as the General Administration for National Security (DGSN), the General Department for External Security and Documentation (DGSED), and intelligence unit offices of the National Army, the Gendarmerie, the Guard, and the Customs, in addition to the General Road Security Rally (GGSR) which was established specifically to counter terrorism funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The Mauritanians based their war on Al-Qaeda on “preemptive operations.” The Mauritanian army raided Al-Qaeda strongholds in northern Mali, inflicting heavy losses on them, and the security successfully attracted the local population on the border-lines, while Al-Qaeda lost many of its allies on the ground.
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC AXIS
The war that Mauritania was fighting against terrorism was still an unprecedented political consensus in a country that has long sustained a political division and fragmentation of the domestic national front, but the strategy adopted by the country in this war successfully brought this domestic front together.
Mauritania well utilized its diplomacy to counter terrorism, as it was one of the first countries to sound the alarm of terrorism in the corridors of the African Union. Nouakchott hosted in 2014 the first “G5 Sahel” Summit that includes Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. Over the last ten years, the level of security and political coordination in the framework of the war on terrorism between Mauritania and the USA, France and the European Union has greatly developed, making Nouakchott the capital of the war on terror in the G5 Sahel.
RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL AXIS
The role of the government was not limited to military force alone; rather, it used the “soft power” of the Mauritanian society. Scholars, jurists, literati, intellectuals, and social notables were motivated and encouraged to work in tandem against the wave of religious militancy.
Mauritanian scholars have issued fatwas warning against the ripple effect of strange religious exaggerations on community; scholars and imams met with radical prisoners and walked them through the pathways of moderation in Islam, the dangers of excommunication of Muslims and the permissibility of bloodshed and looting their property and money. In the same vein, the various public sector authorities organized hundreds of productive and seminal conferences and seminars addressed terrorism through analyses and constructive criticism.
The Mauritanian counterterrorism strategy has been in action for a long term; it well realizes that the war on terrorism will drag on, simply because terrorism per se is an enemy that adapts to different situations. Proverbially, Diamond Cut Diamond; terrorism should be fought by using the same methods it adopts, with a special focus placed on development and education. Despite the gains made by Mauritania, the danger is still imminent, given the increasing growing influence of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel Region, as ISIS has sneaked and snowballed into the region.