​​Arab fighters in foreign countries who return to their homelands pose a serious and complex problem for security forces around the Arab world. It is a developing, rapidly changing threat to the security and stability of Arab countries, particularly given its potential to exacerbate armed conflicts and fuel terrorism.​

As a result, security forces and policymakers have been developing security strategies and plans to combat this phenomenon. This necessitates that terrorism research centers address the updates and intensify their efforts to diagnose its nature and identify the causes, implications, and options for dealing with it. This is the goal of this article, which will also make recommendations on how to deal with the problem and its developments following the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Polarization of Fighters
Almost one month into the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the outbreak of war, both countries started recruiting foreign fighters from the Middle East and neighboring countries. The two sides compete over recruiting the largest number of armed groups and mercenaries. International reports confirm the rising calls for volunteering fighters in Ukrainian embassies abroad, namely in North Africa and some other African countries.

There are no exact estimates of the number of volunteers, but it is undeniably large. The available information on the number of foreign fighters polarized by the two sides is fraught with uncertainty. Russia declared the formation of a battalion of Middle Eastern foreign fighters. Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the polarization of those who wish to support separatists in Eastern Ukraine at a Russian Security Council meeting on 11 March 2022. According to intelligence reports, Russia sent nearly 1,000 mercenaries to Ukraine and recruited even more. Furthermore, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that if the West is keen on assisting Ukraine in recruiting mercenaries, Russia has 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East and Africa ready to fight. Wagner is reported to have moved thousands of mercenaries from Syria and Central Africa alone to the war zone.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared the formation of an international battalion of almost 20,000 volunteering, very well-trained mercenaries from abroad to face the Russian mercenaries' special operations. According to Russian intelligence reports, Ukraine enlisted and trained ISIS fighters at the Al-Tanf US military base in Syria before sending them to fight alongside Ukraine against Russia. 115 Nigerians and 36 Senegalese declared their enlistment in Russian forces, according to The Guardian Nigeria.

Foreign Fighters' Profiles
According to international monitoring reports, pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian fighters include Chechens as well as European, Arab, and African individuals. Wagner, which is utilized in combat zones all over the world to polarize foreign troops and mercenaries, is heavily exploited by Russia. For instance, Wagner has offices in 23 African nations. Since 2018, there have been around 2,000 Wagner elements in Central Africa, and there are almost 8,000 elements in Mali, primarily in Sikasso and Mopti. In addition, there are armed fighters stationed in Nigeria, Mozambique, and Burkina Faso. According to reports, Wagner sent over 4,000 mercenaries from the Central African Republic in January to assassinate Ukrainian leaders, primarily Ukrainian President Zelensky, as a prelude to seizing Kyiv the Ukrainian capital.

Mercenaries of many ethnicities were sought after by both sides. Russia polarized thousands of fighters by using its influence in Libya, Syria, and some African nations. Additionally, terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS made use of social media's crucial role in the polarization and recruitment of mercenaries. Social media are also used for the same purpose by security firms. For instance, the employment website Silent Professionals published an advertisement blatantly asking veterans who were fluent in various languages to secretly travel to Ukraine for a good sum of money.

Some researchers categorize foreign fighters against Russia according to their nationalities, political orientations, and military expertise. According to Ukrainian authorities, nearly 66,000 are dual nationals, people of Ukrainian origin who hold other nationalities. They regularly fight the Russians, as did their fathers and grandfathers in previous Soviet wars, for personal motives based on a family history, beside the desire for national independence and reaffirming Ukraine's sovereignty compared to sprawling Russia. Members of this category do not have exceptional combat expertise. They took civilian professions, received varying degrees of education, and are highly enthusiastic to serve the national cause and fight for the Ukrainian sovereignty.

Describing the Phenomenon
Serious consideration and a thorough investigation of the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters from the Russia-Ukraine war are required to address this issue.

  1. Hybrid Warfare and the Rising Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters: Wars are no longer conventional wars between two regular armies, but have rather become battlegrounds for regular and irregular armies alike. This type of modern warfare (aka hybrid warfare) is, thus, associated with foreign fighters. These wars have caused terrorism and mercenaries to resurface and have led to the involvement of private military companies (PMCs).
  2. The Involvement of Different International Agents in the Russia-Ukraine War: The crisis cannot be reduced to a war between Russia and Ukraine, nor can the phenomenon of foreign fighters be examined in isolation from its broader context. In actuality, the fierce international rivalry between Russia and its allies and the pro-Ukraine US and European nations could be considered the root cause of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Even while Europe and the US refused any military intervention against Russia, they denounced the conflict and provided Ukraine with military assistance. They also secretly supported Russia's efforts to mobilize mercenaries and foreign fighters in the war against Russia.
  3. Employing Irregular Military Forces: Warring rivals rely on various military forces, including PMCs, mercenaries, volunteering fighters, and fundamentalist and extremist groups. They try to polarize as many gangsters and volunteering fighters as possible, who fight for money or for a way out of their crisis-inflicted countries.
    Some experts believe that terrorist organizations' decision to join the Russia-Ukraine war is motivated by a variety of factors. For example, in retaliation aganist Russian military attacks that weakened ISIL's influence in Syria, ISIL factions from Syria joined the fight for Ukraine, countering Russian resurgent influence. Chechen armed factions have also declared their intention to join the Ukrainian battalion in retaliation against Russia's aggression.
  4. Recruiting Foreign Fighters: Conventional warfare has become excessively expensive for all parties. As a result, warring parties seek to reduce the financial and human costs of the conflict by recruiting mercenaries and PMCs. Western governments are keen on receiving foreign fighters who would fight for Ukraine in order to avoid direct confrontations and the high cost of war if it is prolonged by involving European armies, as well as to demonstrate support for Ukraine.
Potential Threats​
Observers warn against the threat of returning foreign fighters from Ukraine to regional and international security. This is a new wave of returnees after the one from conflict zones in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. It poses a direct and indirect threat to Arab security:
  • Direct Threat manifested in the return of fighters and mercenaries to Arab countries and armed conflict zones, such as Libya and Syria, with high combat capabilities, sophisticated arms, and spoils of war. This aggravates more conflicts, compromises security and stability in Arab countries, and causes terrorism to resurface as terrorist groups use their field presence to recruit new mercenaries to fight for them.
  • Indirect Threat manifested in the return of fighters to neighboring areas rather than armed conflict zones in Arab countries, particularly to the Sahel region or the Horn of Africa. For example, fighters returning to the Horn of Africa pose a threat to the security of the Red Sea region and cause terrorist groups to resurface and take hold of the region, such as Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia and ISIS in East Africa. There would even be greater risks had those fighters moved to the conflict-inflicted Yemen.
Options for Arab Countries
The crisis of returning fighters, having been involved in armed conflicts outside their countries, remains a huge threat to regional security and stability. Crises never cease to exist after every war or armed conflict. Security forces are thus required to reassess the potential risks and to examine the response options. In this context, previous experiences should be examined to better address this phenomenon. Some countries managed to develop a legal framework and create programs to reintegrate returning fighters into society after educating them. Meanwhile, other countries failed to embrace and protect them from social stigma which made them join other terrorist groups, more ferociously than ever.
Here we may propose to stop relying on security approaches solely in countering such a phenomenon. Rather, we must adopt a comprehensive countering strategic plan including the following procedures:
  1. International Diplomatic and Legal Action: Arab nations should use their diplomatic influence with the UN and other international bodies to push for the criminalization of the recruitment of mercenaries and foreign fighters in armed conflicts since it jeopardizes both regional and global security. It should be emphasized as well that mercenary recruitment is a war crime punishable by deterrent measures and that countries that support such a phenomenon are neither safe nor immune from its risks.
  2. Regional and Arab Security Coordination: There is an urgent need for security coordination not only among Arab countries, but also with neighbors sharing borders with Arab countries, which necessitates understanding and cooperation to ensure control in border areas and prevent foreign fighters from Ukraine and armed conflict zones from crossing the borders and exploiting political disputes between those countries.
  3. Internal Confrontation: Arab countries must intensify their media efforts to raise awareness against the phenomenon of foreign fighters and their supporting foreign agencies. Moreover, Arab governments should continue their efforts to improve the economic status of marginalized groups, find solutions to the refugees' situation, as well as reach Arab solutions to armed conflicts in the Arab world, to curb the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters. Scholars, advocates, sheikhs, and scholars of Islamic studies should also have a strong contribution to this media confrontation.
Concluding Recommendations
This article recommends promoting Arab cooperation to combat the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters from armed conflict zones and to develop solutions, policies, and long-term strategic plans to address this potentially recurring phenomenon as modern and hybrid warfare evolves. It also suggests rethinking the development of counter-terrorism departments or entities, as well as their associated Arab and regional security initiatives and services. They should include specialists and experts from all military, security, political, religious, and cultural fields to provide recommendations and solutions to policymakers so that they can take comprehensive and preemptive measures to address the phenomenon of returning fighters from armed conflict zones.​