TACKLING TERRORISM IN BRITAIN - THREATS, RESPONSES, AND CHALLENGES TWENTY YEARS AFTER 9/11

The book investigates the legal and political implications of Britain’s counter-terrorism strategy, as well as the obstacles to implementation. It is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One discusses the concepts and trends of counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom. The philosophical doctrine of terrorism is discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three focuses on the three main types of domestic terrorism that Britain is currently dealing with: dissident Irish republicans, far-right extremists, and jihadists. Chapters Four, Five and Six address the obstacles that the CONTEST approach faces. Chapter Seven concludes with some final thoughts on the most pressing risks and challenges to the implementation and evolution of British counter-terrorism policy.

Chapter One reveals that in their fight against the state, terrorist movements are linked to groups that use violence to achieve private political goals and to target and terrorize civilians. There have been attempts to present precise definitions of terrorism, yet there is no specific definition and terrorism often overlaps with other forms of political violence such as violent resistance to tyranny, occupation, hate crimes, violent protest, and riots that may involve the use of weapons.

Patterns of global political violence developed through four waves: anarchic violence, anti-imperialist movements, violence linked to the left and the new right, and religious violence. In Britain, terrorist violence developed in two phases: the Irish Republican Army’s operations which emerged from 1970 to 2003, and, since 2003, the groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS as well as local and cross-border groups.

The terms “counter-terrorism” and “terrorism” are both vague. Counter-terrorism is defined by some experts as “any formal or informal, legal or illegal act intended to respond to or deal with terrorism expected from third parties.” As a result, terrorism may be a reaction to perceived terrorism. For example, since the twelfth century during the colonization of Ireland, the Irish Republican Army has contended that its armed struggle was a reaction to the British armed terror.

Providing security on the one hand and maintaining freedom on the other is a critical problem in the fight against terrorism. ‘Those who would give up necessary Liberty to purchase a little transient Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety,’ Benjamin Franklin famously said in this context. In reality, the only way to counteract violence is to limit some freedoms, which pits security and liberty against each other. The Human Rights Act of 1998 in the United Kingdom, as well as all international human rights treaties, distinguish between ‘non-derogable’ and ‘derogable’ human rights. However, most human rights are non-derogable, according to Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Article establishes the human right to be free of torture and degrading treatment, such as servitude and forced labour, or being sentenced to a court verdict that is more severe or being killed without a legitimate death penalty. Otherwise, some other human rights, such as economic and social rights, may be suspended in the interest of national security. 

Security and liberty have always had a strained relationship. Successive democratic British administrations had to draw a line between “prevention,” “criminalization,” and “punishment” while implementing anti-terror programmes and regulations. They also had to establish a partnership between the state and society, address social grievances, and deal with violent beliefs; that is, balancing the risks of carrying out the counter-terrorism policy objectives, particularly the “prevention” aspect, and building social “resistance” in the face of violence and terrorism, thus confirming the dimension of preparedness. Governments in the United Kingdom have attempted to mitigate the damage caused by terrorist acts by saving residents’ lives and giving vital aid, but components of “social resistance” are still being developed.

According to the June 2016 Referendum Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, which would take effect in December 2020, has had an impact on the reformulation of counter-terrorism policy since then.

In two ways, the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism connections with the European Union have been outlined. The first is that Britain was a signatory to the European Union’s anti-terrorism laws and programmes, as well as its bureaucratic apparatus. The second is that it is a participant in European intelligence-sharing alliances. The European Union and the Council of Europe created a cross-border counter-terrorism policy in the aftermath of the September attacks. Since 1977, when it produced the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe has been a pioneer in this field. 

Although counter-terrorism policies were coherent when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, the European Union’s role in defining internal national policies was minor. As a result, British counter-terrorism policies were unaffected by “Brexit” because the United Kingdom remains a member of European legal and punitive arrangements such as the European Arrest Warrant System. However, Ireland’s final status was agreed upon in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, and the borders between the Ireland and Northern Ireland are still almost non-existent, necessitating border control, which  is the current source of concern following “Brexit.”

The second chapter demonstrates that, in light of the ongoing bloodshed in the UK, both left and right movements had national aspirations. Despite international support from armed organisations and regimes such as Libya’s Gaddafi and the Irish-American populace, the Irish Republican Army’s threat had no international possibilities. Its goals were completely separatist in nature. This distinguishes its threat from that of “global extremist” groups wreaking havoc on the “crescent of anarchy” reaching from North Africa to India’s and China’s borders.  The author strives to uncover the origins of the global phenomenon of extremism, and the emergence of extreme combative movements.

The Republican Army, the extreme right, and extremist movements are all examined in the third chapter as terrorist threats to British society. It balances these movements by examining their evolution, ideas, and methods of operation. Before delving into this polemic, the author points out that some extremist nationalist movements, such as extremists from Wales who attack the properties of the “English,” and extreme left movements led by “Anarchists,” “Environmentalists and Animal Rights,” and “Anti-globalism” advocates, continue to perpetrate acts of violence in the United Kingdom.

Many adherents of these organisations and groups do not support organised violence, and their violent activities are limited in scope and intensity. The far left is typically a catch-all word for disparate forces unified only by old communist slogans like anti-class division and universal human salvation, which is why, unlike the three currents of violence, it does not pose an immediate threat.

Because of their resistance to the “Belfast” agreement of 1998, which halted the Irish Republican Army’s activities and merged its political wing “Sin Fein” into British political life, Irish Republicans are referred to as dissidents or separatists. Small organizations such as the Real Irish Republican Army and the Irish Liberation Army represent this movement.

The Irish dissidents’ roots may be traced back to the British Crown’s policies, which resulted in a sectarian split in the north between Irish Catholics and Protestants from the English, Scots, and Irish. The First World War and its aftermath saw a political rift between those who wanted to stay under the British crown and those who wanted to secede. The conflict between them concluded in the 1922 agreement, which established the Republic of Southern Ireland while keeping Northern Ireland (Ulster) under British rule. Under the power of the Protestant majority, Catholics were reduced to a minority. Catholic middle-class activists attempted to organise themselves in the 1960s in the manner of the American “civil rights movement,” but their demands were met with organised violence from the army and police, and paramilitary groups of loyal Protestants grew, leading to the emergence of the Irish Republican Army in 1969, which spread its operations in Ireland and Britain during the era of turmoil, and ended with the signing of the Belfast agreement.

Anti-Good Friday Agreement organisations ideology and language are predicated on the rejection of any permanent peace in Northern Ireland until British rule is ended and a unitary Irish Republic takes its place. These organisations accept that discriminatory attitudes targeting Irish Catholics are declining, but they oppose the Belfast Agreement because it exacerbates conflict and obstructs the republic’s formation.

Joining the Irish Republican Army was tied to devotion to the group during the period of turbulence, and it needed a high level of commitment and restraint, as well as a margin of maneuvering on the side of the political branch of the organisation, “Sin Fein.” Individual “lone wolves” were thus a rare occurrence. The group was successful in obtaining public support through a variety of methods, including hunger strikes in British prisons, but the Republican Army’s use of violence was planned and carried out on a daily basis. Following the signing of the Belfast Agreement, insurgent groups continued to use aggressive tactics, which resulted in the murder of dozens of people in 1998. The British government classified these terrorists in 2007 as “extremely dangerous”, yet they continued to practice violence, which led to a decline in their support.

Hundreds of individuals have been killed in Britain as a result of radical right-wing groups’ violence, and while the size of operations and the number of persons joining these organizations are restricted, they nonetheless pose a significant threat. The world continues to be affected by devastating events perpetrated by far-right groups and individuals in other countries, such as the Christ Church massacre in New Zealand in March 2019, which killed about 50 Muslims and which is considered the deadliest in New Zealand’s modern history.

These movements are an outgrowth of Europe’s extreme right, neo-Nazism, or neo-fascist movements. They see their radicalism as a reaction to the September 11 tragic attacks, as well as a defence of Western civilisation in the face of existential threats. Liberal elites, the political left, and proponents of multiculturalism are among the opponents. Far-right movements reject and criticise public institutions; they have been unable to achieve political and democratic recognition, and their adherents are frequently accused of violence and hate crimes.

This trend is represented by organisations such as Britain First and the English Defense League, whose rhetoric is based on Islamophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment, gay rights, multiculturalism, and anti-Semitism. These organizations intrinsically disagree with one another. The English Defense League, for example, maintains its secular rhetoric, whereas Britain First advocates for the adoption of Christianity in British society. According to some observers, in the last two decades, Britain’s new groups have gotten more dissident, divided, and violent. They are seeing an uptick in the number of “lone wolves” who have converted to extremism and carried out individual terrorist attacks.

Thomas Mair, who assassinated Labor MP Joe Cox in 2016, and Darren Osborne, who drove a truck to murder worshipers in Finsbury Park in 2017, are the most well-known of these. The influence of social media is evident in the recruitment of these individuals and their subsequent involvement in destructive operations.

The author believes that tracing the roots of terrorist organizations in the United Kingdom can be done through a number of complex political and social domains, the most essential of which are: 

Following WWII, Muslim migration to Britain was dominated by the Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi groups. Then, beginning in the 1970s, with the influx of Arab and African immigrants, variety began to rule over the Muslim population. After 2011, the proportion of Muslim immigrants to the United Kingdom did not exceed 10%.

Muslims make about 5% of the entire population of the United Kingdom. The Muslim community is diverse in terms of ethnicity and sectarianism. Due to the great weight of the Muslims of southern India within the community, the Depondian, Provili and Sufi orders dominate the doctrinal orientations of the majority of British Muslims, with a small presence of Ahl al-Hadith.

According to 2014 figures, 50% of British Muslims are poor, compared to 27% of Sikhs, 22% of Hindus, and 19% of British Catholics. The rise in Muslim poverty rates is attributed to reasons such as  lack of labour market qualifications, low income, and a large number of unproductive children.

Islamophobia is an irrational anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiment. There are several examples of discrimination against Muslims, ranging from mockery and insults to murder. In addition, there is racial discrimination based on race. Muslims, particularly those from Ireland and Wales, have a non-white population of 92 percent. 

The grievances of extremist groups in Britain highlight the discourse of violence, and their origins can be traced back to the emergence of a number of extremist Islamic religious associations, whose discourse is based on misinterpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah since the “Salman Rushdie” incident in the 1980s. Some of these organizations urged young Muslims in the United Kingdom to avoid serving in the army because it aids in the fight against Muslims in other parts of the world.

This discourse is obvious in statements recorded prior to the execution of various suicide operations, such as the testimony of “Muhammad Siddiq Khan,” the perpetrator of the July 7 attack in London in 2005, in which he stated that he was a soldier  in an endless war against the anti-Muslim forces. The testimony of “ Nicky Reilly”, the man charged with the attempted bombing of a restaurant in Exeter in May 2008, confirms the “doctrine of death”, “redemption” and “blood sacrifice”. The discourse of these movements refers to Britain’s crimes against Muslims in the “land of Islam” in the colonial era.

The connection between Britain and Islamic organisations was, was dominated by the era of safety in the 1980s and 1990s. The “Salman Rushdie” incident had a significant impact on the mobilization and unification of groups in Britain, led by the “Islamic Liberation Party,” the “Islamic Parliament,” and the “Al-Ihya [Revivalist] Association,” as well as their religious call for their members to engage in terrorist activities outside Britain.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent war waged by the US and Britain against al-Qaeda and its allies, created a battleground inside Britain. These organisations began recruiting British Muslims, whether the offspring of immigrants or those who were born in the United Kingdom,  most of whom young men under thirty. 

According to British security agencies, approximately 23,000 British Muslims are under security surveillance, with just 7,000 of them suspected of participating in these movements, including 500 people who are under strict security surveillance. In Britain, hardline preachers like as “Abu Hamza al-Masry,” “Abu Qatada,” “Zakaria Mousavi,” and “Anjem Choudary,” are involved in recruiting.   As British citizens, many of these individuals had previously received care and financial assistance from the British government. According to some analysts, many radical cell recruits in the United Kingdom feel excluded and have a crisis of identity and belonging.

There is no evidence that British extremist hardliners are trained in the United Kingdom. Rather, the majority of them want to emigrate and join extremist organizations’ camps abroad, as the terrorist organization ISIS did, luring thousands of them to Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan. Following their training, such elements return to Britain to become time bombs and a potential threat.

The author examines the “protection and preparation” aspects of British counter-terrorism policy (CONTEST) in Chapter Four.  The protection component strives to improve public safety and safeguard British interests at home and abroad. It entails securing borders, transportation systems, and vital infrastructure, as well as retaining control over goods, knowledge, and information that could be exploited to achieve terrorist purposes. This protection was manifested in a number of measures, the most important of which are:

The British authorities keep an eye on the security of land borders and airports, which became a major cause of worry after the September 11 attacks. Trusted partners, international agencies, the Schengen information system, European police, and INTERPOL all share traveller information, including biometrics. The United Kingdom insists that the flight information exchange system will continue after the country exits the European Union. However, the increasingly strict security procedures raise concerns about “the privacy of travellers’ bodies,” as stated in a 2010 report by the Foreign Affairs Committee, which prompted the Ministry of Interior to launch the “Future Travel Security Solutions” project in 2016. The costly project includes research on developing quantum imaging techniques and machine learning algorithms to balance the effectiveness of protection, security and personal privacy. The drone crisis in 2018-2019 prompted the airports of “Gatwick and Heathrow” to use military techniques in security operations and raised the readiness of the Air Force to ward off the attack by drones.

Specialized officers can stop and question anyone passing through ports, airports, trains, and border areas between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland under Article 7 of the amended British Terrorism Act of 2000. Failure to cooperate with the authorities is a legal infraction under this amendment, which empowers authorities to search and fish for information. Other regulatory elements indicated in subsequent amended legislation emphasize the need to avoid inspecting on ethnic or religious grounds. Although statistics show that the Seventh Amendment was rarely invoked, the issue was not without legal squabbling. Because the “Seventh Amendment” lacked provisions to avoid abuse, the European Court of Human Rights refused to approve it. Nonetheless, the British Supreme Court ruled in favor of the amendment for its correspondence with human rights and recognized its usefulness in protecting national security.

The events of September prompted a reconsideration of immigration and refugee regulations, which had been criticized as being too loose, particularly in the run-up to Brexit. Individuals suspected of committing, plotting, or instigating terrorist actions may have their immigration and asylum petitions denied under Part 54 of the Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Law of 2006. This is in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations. Persons who pose a security threat to the host country may be deported, according to paragraph 32 of the previous article. Due to the proactive preventative reasons mentioned above, evaluating the danger or threat depends on the assessments of the concerned authorities, which leads to some discrepancies in those perspectives.

Examining the background of the individuals involved and issuing judicial orders barring entrance are two instances. Some lawyers claim that forcibly returning refugees and asylum seekers to their home countries breaches international immigration regulations, which prohibit refugees from being deported unless their lives are in danger or in case they are being persecuted. The authorities were left with two choices: place the suspects under home arrest or deport them to a nation where they would not be harassed and would be safer.

Guns, explosives, poisons, and radioactive, chemical, biological, and nuclear substances are among the harmful materials that the British Ministry of the Interior aims to prohibit. This entails tight restrictions on the sale, procurement, and storage of these commodities. Since the issuing of the Firearms Act in 1968, the United Kingdom has been one of the strictest countries in banning the possession of personal weapons and explosives. The law governing the creation and storage of explosive materials outlined the procedures for obtaining the necessary permits to use these items. Nuclear and radioactive material production and storage are governed by international agreements to which Britain has agreed. 

In the event of a terrorist attack, the preparedness component of counter-terrorism policy refers to the importance of protecting lives, minimizing damage, and providing immediate assistance, as well as the need for strong and meaningful responses and coordination between the concerned agencies to minimize the effects of the attack on local communities. Following a series of attacks, such as the “Manchester Square” assault in May 2017, the British authorities were accused of failing in this area, prompting the authorities to begin organized campaigns to increase awareness of the significance of “preparedness” in a variety of circles.

Building and sustaining civil emergency services, as well as specialized preparations to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assaults, are all part of these preparations. These aspects have been entrusted to bodies such as firefighting, ambulance, health services supported by the National Hazard Assessment Agency, the army, the police, and agencies specialized in countering uncommon attacks.

This entails effective and efficient crisis management, the ability to restore normalcy to attack sites and public services such as energy, transportation, and communications, as well as the prompt treatment of terrorist attack victims. The Joint Government Victims of Terrorism Unit was established in 2017 to coordinate with local authorities, the police, and national and regional organisations, and to ensure that victims and relatives of those deceased receive prompt assistance. However, there are certain notable flaws as when the majority of material damage compensation goes to owners and airlines rather than individuals.

According to Chapter 5, the most contentious aspect of British anti-terror policy is terrorist prevention. It entails stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, addressing terrorist ideologies and revealing their corruption, as well as providing assistance to people at risk of joining terrorist movements. Attempting to change, contain, pardon, and rehabilitate opponents is an old tactic that has proven effective in dealing with radical ideologies in many countries. In the 1980s, Italy initiated the “Repentance” campaign in an attempt to de-radicalize communist movements. Egypt and Algeria initiated programmes in the 1990s to reintegrate elements of armed groups and reject their ideologies. Following the events of the 9/11 events, Western countries began to integrate these programmes into their counter-terrorism policies.

The United Kingdom’s interest in a “protection” and “prevention” policy dates back to 2002, when it highlighted the need for special preparations to prevent future generations from succumbing to violent extremism. The government unveiled “prevention” plans in 2006, which included addressing the origins of extremism by resolving systemic issues such as prejudice and inequality within and without the UK, as well as deterring individuals who advocate terrorism and recruit others.

This programme was executed in two stages, the first of which lasted from 2006 to 2011 and was marked by a lack of public debate, specialization, defined limits, and relevant institutions. The methods for implementation were unclear, and the financial resources allotted were insufficient. Many organisations and institutions, including local clubs, mosques, Islamic schools, and charities, were given particular attention. The Department for Communities and Local Government took over the monitoring of these institutions from the Ministry of the Interior. In 2008, the government said that all local governments must work together to implement this strategy in accordance with the government’s strategic plans. However, it had clear flaws, such as a lack of separation between prevention-focused organisations, the idea that the entire Muslim community in the United Kingdom is under surveillance and espionage, and the lack of an evaluation mechanism and indicators of control over plan implementation.

The second phase began in 2010, when David Cameron’s government reformulated the “Prevention” strategy and its objectives as follows: 

The most significant change was the shift from monitoring to engaging with appropriate agencies and sectors. However, other issues went unresolved, resulting in the rise of new challenges, such as the lack of transparency. “De-fundamentalism” programmes have been chastised for lacking a scientific foundation for efficacy in reducing perceived risk.

However, engaging the public with the “big picture” is the most difficult task facing preventative plans. The second stage attempted to focus on terrorism rather than relationships within and outside the Muslim community. It was difficult to separate the two sides, hence the threats of Muslims feeling targeted persisted. Some argue that preventative programmes still exclude former extremists from being “de-radicalized,” though they may be more successful in dealing with extremism due to their prior experience. Others argue that the prevention technique is flawed because it may replace “British values” for the values of the communities in question, particularly Islamic groups, raising concerns about the extent to which Muslims are integrated into British society.

The pursuit of terrorists is linked to reacting to terrorist problems, tracing down individuals participating in terrorist operations, and prosecuting them, according to Chapter VI. It’s a complicated method with several steps:

The lack of distinction between a terrorist act and other crimes, such as murder, possession of illicit weapons, or explosives, is one intriguing drawback. Therefore, terrorists will be prosecuted under the British Criminal Code. In addition to the fact that the Terrorism Law of 2000 does not distinguish terrorism from any other crime in terms of legal and criminal nature, the articles dealing with these crimes are broad and are not limited to a specific form of terrorism. The author agrees that criminal law is adequate and that elaborate legislation is not required to deal with terrorist acts.

These elements are a crucial part of the counter-terrorism strategy; they also have a legal and judicial function. They are the “evidence” used to prosecute persons who have committed crimes. Multiple human sources, such as detainees, prisoners, informants, and agents, as well as satellite photos, signals, and biometrics, were added to intelligence strategies. The Investigative Powers Law was passed in 2000 in response to the critical importance of online information, and another law was passed in 2016 that authorizes intelligence officers and others to monitor Internet recordings without judicial authorization.

The question of “individual freedom,” which includes the possibility of violating an individual’s privacy, is raised by the collection of information. If the people being targeted are members of a community that has become the subject of security surveillance, such as the Islamic community, the controversy escalates. The British government entered into a series of negotiations with the EU in order to strike an appropriate balance between individual and collective rights on the one hand, and to enable intelligence to collect information on terrorist crimes on the other, resulting in an agreement on four items, namely:

       A. Accuracy: the existence of legal methods that guarantee the reduction of indiscriminate security pursuits.

      D. Enabling the affected to file a complaint in the event of a violation of their rights and to conduct special trials.

Punitive executive measures are the most contentious portion of the pursuit component. Those who commit terrorist acts face the same penalties as those who commit other crimes, whether they are detained or imprisoned. Some of these individuals may be unusual offenders, such as one who is plotting a suicide attack that will kill dozens of people. To correct this imbalance, the government used harsher measures such as administrative detention, travel and movement restrictions, and the revocation of British citizenship. These procedures must be founded on solid evidence in order to avoid violations of human rights or the law.

In the final chapter, the author provides some important findings:

The threat of terrorism to Britain is real; the least significant threat is from Irish Republican dissidents, followed by far-right terrorists. Extremist group terrorism is the most dangerous sort. It is a local manifestation of a worldwide phenomenon, shaped by deep-seated historical, cultural, intellectual, social, and economic factors. Although Britain occupied some Islamic nations for centuries, causing the creation of extremist organisations, this fact does not justify the emergence of local branches of extremist organisations.

The overall framework that London has created over two decades for dealing with terrorist threats lies in Britain’s counter-terrorism policy. It draws on experience dealing with security risks during the upheavals that occurred between 1969 and 1998 in many legal and political dimensions. The purpose of contemporary politics is to establish “social resilience” in the face of terrorist violence. Therefore, it’s critical to emphasize the first three policy elements: preparedness, protection, and prevention. 

Verifying the transparency of the implementation of laws and related policies, their accountability, their compatibility with human rights, ensuring public awareness and understanding of this policy, and wisely managing its social effects are the most significant challenges facing this policy and its strategic plans.

The author concludes by mentioning four elements that are necessary to support society and the state’s position in the face of terrorism: educating citizens about the dangers of terrorism; activating the law to protect society and prevent terrorism while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms; confronting Islamophobia and educating populations on the significance of distinguishing between individual Muslim radicalism and Islam’s demand for peace, justice, and tolerance; and the importance of acknowledging Muslims’ essential contributions to society and public life in the United Kingdom, particularly in the battle against terrorism.